Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law
Journal
Volume 17 Volume XVII
Number 2 Volume XVII Book 2

Article 4

2006

The Economics of Cultural Misrepresentation: How Should the
Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990 Be Marketed?
Jennie D. Woltz
Fordham University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj
Part of the Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons, and the Intellectual Property Law
Commons

Recommended Citation
Jennie D. Woltz, The Economics of Cultural Misrepresentation: How Should the Indian Arts and Crafts Act
of 1990 Be Marketed?, 17 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 443 (2006).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj/vol17/iss2/4

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal
by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information,
please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

The Economics of Cultural Misrepresentation: How Should the Indian Arts and
Crafts Act of 1990 Be Marketed?
Cover Page Footnote
Professors Stephen Urice, Alexander Bauer, Professor Kenneth Plevan, the IPLJ staff and board members,
Costantino, Sam Cocks and Benjamin Folkinshteyn

This note is available in Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal:
https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj/vol17/iss2/4

WOLTZ_GALLEYPROOF_120106.DOC

1/23/2007 4:40 PM

The Economics of Cultural
Misrepresentation: How Should the
Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990
Be Marketed?
Jennie D. Woltz∗
INTRODUCTION .............................................................................445
I. HISTORY OF THE INDIAN ARTS AND CRAFTS ACT
OF 1990...................................................................................447
A. IN NEED OF ECONOMIC AID: THE INDIAN ARTS AND
CRAFTS ACT OF 1935.........................................................447
B. DETERMINING INDIANNESS AND THE INDIAN GAP ................447
II. THE COUNTERFEIT INDIAN GOODS PROBLEM .........................447
A. HUNGRY FOR A PIECE OF INDIAN CULTURE ........................447
B. LEGISLATIVE REACTIONS TO THE COUNTERFEIT INDIAN
GOODS PROBLEM: THE INDIAN ARTS AND CRAFTS ACT
OF 1990 ............................................................................447
C. IMPLICATIONS FOR CONSUMERS’ EXPECTATIONS OF
“AUTHENTICITY”...............................................................447
1. What is “Authenticity” Anyway? ..............................447

∗

J.D. candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2007; B.A., English, University
of Pennsylvania, 2004. I would like to thank Professors Stephen Urice and Alexander
Bauer for their continued inspiration and support with this Note, and otherwise; Professor
Kenneth Plevan for helping me refine and focus this Note; the IPLJ staff and board
members, but especially Melanie Costantino and Sam Cocks for their editing acumen and
insightfulness; my family and friends, without whom nothing else would matter; and
Benjamin Folkinshteyn, who is always the best. All errors in logic and expression are my
own.

443

WOLTZ_GALLEYPROOF_120106.DOC

444

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

1/23/2007 4:40 PM

Vol. 17:443

D. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS: PROSECUTION UNDER
THE IACA..........................................................................447
1. Native American Arts, Inc. v. Waldron Corp. ...........447
2. Native American Arts, Inc. v. Hartford Casualty
Insurance Co. .............................................................447
III. A CULTURAL AND ECONOMIC ASSET .....................................447
A. A NEW PERSPECTIVE: WHY THE INDIAN ARTS
AND CRAFTS ACT OF 1990 IS NOT A CULTURAL
HERITAGE LAW ..................................................................447
B. INDIAN V. KNOCK-OFF: THE ONLY DICHOTOMY?................447
IV. THE PROBLEM WITH LEGAL ANALOGIES ................................447
A. THE USE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN
MATTERS OF CULTURAL HERITAGE.....................................447
1. Legal Analogy to Intellectual Property Regimes
May Lead to Absurd Results in Cultural
Heritage Contexts.......................................................447
2. Intellectual Property Rights Have Practical
Application Limitations .............................................447
3. Cultural Heritage Involves Forms and Notions
not Contemplated by Traditional Intellectual
Property Regimes.......................................................447
B. TRADEMARKS: THE NEXT FRONTIER IN INDIAN REFORM......447
1. False Designation of Indianness as a Lanham
Act § 43(a) Violation .................................................447
a) Can Notions of Self-Identity be “False”? ............447
b) The Strict Liability Requirement .........................447
C. IT’S JUST TOO PERSONAL: WHY LAWMAKERS SHOULD
BE SENSITIVE TO ISSUES OF IDENTITY ..................................447
V. IN NEED OF A SOLUTION ........................................................447
A. ALIGNING CONSUMER AND INDIAN INTEREST: A GAME
OF REDEFINITION...............................................................447
1. Redefining Indianness................................................447
2. Redefining Authenticity.............................................447
3. Requiring Intent to Deceive .......................................447
B. ADDITIONAL EFFORTS ........................................................447
VI. CONCLUSION...........................................................................447

WOLTZ_GALLEYPROOF_120106.DOC

2007

1/23/2007 4:40 PM

INDIAN ARTS AND CRAFTS ACT

445

INTRODUCTION
Counterfeit goods are everywhere.
In an age where
1
counterfeiters sell knock-off designer bags and watches with
impunity and society hardly recognizes the casual purchase of
counterfeits as a moral wrongdoing,2 counterfeit goods—whether
in the form of a trendy handbag or burned CD—serve as a
prevalent thread in the weave of modern America’s cultural
fabric.3 Why stop, then, at creating goods that add to culture, when
culture itself can be counterfeited? Factories in Asia produce rugs,
dolls, and dream catchers—among other items—that are shipped to
America as “authentic American Indian goods,” where retailers
rapidly sell these ersatz wares to (usually) non-Indian consumers
hungry for a piece of Indian4 culture.5
Today’s counterfeit goods, which frequently come from
overseas sources, are typically mass produced or are otherwise of a
lower quality than “authentic” Indian goods, and thus can be sold
less expensively.6 The high demand for Indian goods, fueled in
part by the New Age movement and increased travel and
consumerism in America in the 1970s and 1980s,7 results in the
diversion of millions of dollars a year from Indian communities to
counterfeiters, which in turn leads to increased poverty in Indian
1

This Note uses the words “knockoff,” “counterfeit,” “fake,” and other similar terms
interchangeably. The use of varying terms does not connote legal distinctions. This Note
employs all such phrases to refer to goods whose makers misrepresent the origin of their
goods’ manufacture or production.
2
Lauren D. Amendolara, Note, Knocking Out Knock-Offs: Effectuating the
Criminalization of Trafficking in Counterfeit Goods, 15 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA
& ENT. L.J. 789, 809–10 (2005).
3
See id. at 812–13.
4
This Note uses the term “Indian” to signify descendents of the indigenous peoples
who were living in North America when Europeans first arrived. The Note employs the
term “Indian” for the purpose of retaining the terminology of the Indian Arts and Crafts
Act. Readers should not construe the term, which this Note uses interchangeably with
Native American and American Indian, as pejorative in any way.
5
See Jon Parsley, Comment, Regulation of Counterfeit Indian Arts and Crafts: An
Analysis of the Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990, 18 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 487, 489
(1993).
6
See id. at 495.
7
See, e.g., William J. Hapiuk, Jr., Note, Of Kitsch and Kachinas: A Critical Analysis
of the Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1009, 1016 (2001); Parsley,
supra note 5, at 489.
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communities.8 The effect of these fakes is not only economic—the
mere existence of cheap, counterfeit goods passed off as
“authentic” is offensive to many Native Americans and Native
American communities.9 Counterfeit products may misappropriate
sacred symbols and practices; the products may be
misrepresentative of the kind of product traditionally produced by
a certain community or may be made with inappropriate materials
or methods of production; the inferior quality of the fakes is simply
insulting to artists and other Indians, who feel that the inferior
quality mocks Indian culture and beliefs.10
To ameliorate the harm that such counterfeits cause, Congress
devised a solution: the Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990 (the
“IACA,” the “Act,” or the “1990 Act”).11 Modeled after the
Lanham Act,12 the IACA makes it a crime for non-Indians to sell
goods in a manner that falsely suggests they are “Indian-made.”13
The idea behind this prohibition is logical: a requirement
mandating that retailers properly mark crafts made by non-Indians
would prevent consumer deception, which in turn would improve
consumer confidence and eradicate consumer confusion.14 There
would be no more mistaken purchasing of fake goods by
discriminating consumers.15 No money would be lost to fraudulent
sellers and Indian nations could improve economically, leading to
greater political and economic autonomy.16 The proper labeling of

8

See Parsley, supra note 5, at 495–96.
See Hapiuk, supra note 7, at 1020 n.52 (citing John Henry Merryman, Counterfeit
Art, 1 INT’L J. CULTURAL PROP. 1, 34 (1992).
10
See id. at 1021–22.
11
Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-644, 104 Stat. 4662, 4662
(codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 305, 305d, 305e (2000)).
12
15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1051–1129 (West 2006). The Lanham Act is the current federal
trademark statute in America. It is not the exclusive law governing trademarks in
America, as both common law and state statutes offer trademark protection. A trademark
can be any word, phrase, symbol, design, smell, color, or product packaging (trade dress)
used by a seller to identify its products or services to distinguish them from other
products or services sold or provided by others. For a discussion of trademark law and
policies, see infra Part IV.B.
13
18 U.S.C. § 1159(a) (2000).
14
See Parsley, supra note 5, at 497.
15
See id.
16
See id. at 496.
9
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fakes as such essentially would solve the problems of
misappropriation and misrepresentation as well.17
Not all people who identify themselves as “Indian,”18 however,
celebrate such a “solution.” In practice, this Act effectively makes
Indianness a trademark, vesting the exclusive right to use the term
“Indian” to those recognized as “Indian” under the Act.19 This
includes only Indians recognized by federal or state governments
as Indian, and artisans certified by tribes.20 The Act’s definition of
“Indian” excludes many citizens who identify as Indian ethnically,
racially or culturally.21 Such individuals are unable to represent
their goods as “Indian-made” to consumers, or command a similar
market price, without risking prosecution.22 They are therefore
disadvantaged when made to compete with counterfeiters, who can
sell more goods inexpensively.23
The economic effects of this Act are supplemented by the
implications that the Act has for such individuals’ cultural identity:
many are outraged and offended by the Act’s definition of
“Indian,” as they feel the Act’s strict demarcation of who “counts”
as an Indian undercuts their sense of self, family, and tradition.24
Such sentiments suggest that the Act’s definition of Indianness is
imperfect in that it fails to protect many deserving artisans who fall
into this Indian Gap25 from potential litigation.26 Thus, despite the

17
It is interesting to note that the Act does not entirely eliminate economic problems
for Indian artisans. Since the Act still permits the sale of fake goods as long as sellers do
not hold such wares out as Indian-made, for undiscriminating consumers who are
ambivalent as to the authenticity of their purchases, the initiative of the Act may be for
naught, as fake goods will still compete with authentic Indian goods in the eyes of such
consumers because of their attractively lower price points.
18
See Hapiuk, supra note 7, at 1012–14.
19
18 U.S.C. § 1159(a) (2000).
20
18 U.S.C. § 1159(c) (2000).
21
Authorities estimate that this group could include as many as seven million
Americans. See GAIL K. SHEFFIELD, THE ARBITRARY INDIAN: THE INDIAN ARTS AND
CRAFTS ACT OF 1990, at 88 (1997).
22
18 U.S.C. § 1159(b) (2000).
23
See Parsley, supra note 5, at 495.
24
See Hapiuk, supra note 7, at 1033–36.
25
This Note employs this term to refer to Indians who do not qualify for enrollment but
who are culturally, ethnically, racially or spiritually affiliated, and nevertheless consider
themselves Indian.
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noble intentions of the Act’s framers, the Act in effect punishes
members of the same community it was created to protect.27
The IACA, as demonstrated, is not without flaws.28 First,
determining who is an Indian, and therefore able to seek protection
under the IACA, is problematic.29 The Act’s definition of “Indian”
is solely a political demarcation that is insufficient in that it fails to
include individuals who deserve protection, but who instead are
potentially liable as counterfeiters under the Act. Secondly, it is
likely that such a faulty classification system is both an under and
over-inclusive filter for what consumers “really want” when
buying Indian products.
This Note addresses how this Act affects and fails to protect
individuals who fall into the Indian Gap and consequently cannot
qualify as legitimate Indian artists under the statute. Specifically,
this Note details how varying interpretations and understandings of
this Act—both judicial and anthropological—fail to provide any
realistic conception of how to alleviate the concerns arising from
both the counterfeit Indian goods crisis and the creation of the
IACA.
Part I discusses background to the Act, including the enactment
of its precursor, the Indian Arts and Craft Act of 1935 (the “1935
Act”),30 in subsection A, and the legislation’s problematic
definition of Indianness31 in subsection B. Part II details the
counterfeit Indian goods problem, while it also discusses varying
legislative, judicial, and consumer understandings of the IACA as
well as the goal it purports to accomplish. Part III discusses the
IACA’s cultural and economic implications. Part IV discusses the
problem of analogizing the IACA to trademark law, especially
because of the IACA’s cultural implications, and suggests that
26
Similarly, out of fear of exposure to liability under the Act, museums which hold
artifacts of Indian heritage have begun to close, because of uncertainty over whether the
makers of artifacts labeled “Indian” would meet the Act’s definition. See Hapiuk, supra
note 7, at 1011.
27
See id.
28
See id. at 1014.
29
See id. at 1012–13.
30
Ch. 748, 49 Stat. 891 (current version at 25 U.S.C. §§ 305, 305b, 305c, 305e & 18
U.S.C. § 1159 (2000)).
31
See 25 C.F.R. § 309.2(a) (2006).
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lawmakers remain sensitive to such issues. Part V concludes with
a recommendation on how to tailor the act to realign consumer
desire with artisan production in an effort to fulfill the Act’s
intended purpose of preventing counterfeit goods from competing
with authentic ones, but without depriving artisans the right to call
themselves or their goods “Indian.”
I. HISTORY OF THE INDIAN ARTS AND CRAFTS ACT OF 1990
A. In Need of Economic Aid: The Indian Arts and Crafts Act of
1935
In the wake of the Meriam Report of 1928,32 which found the
living conditions of Native Americans deplorable, a new reformed
Indian policy took root in the 1930s, resulting in the creation of the
Indian Arts and Craft Act and the establishment of the Indian Arts
and Crafts Board (the “IACB” or the “Board”) in 1935.33 The
Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1935 (the “1935 Act”) intended to
promote the economic well-being of American Indians through the
protection and establishment of an authentic arts and crafts
market.34 This Act also authorized the Indian Arts and Crafts
Board to engage in market and technical research; recommend
loans; refer complaints of counterfeiting to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation; and administer a system of acquiring trademarks for
Indians in order to ensure “genuineness and quality.”35
The 1935 Act, a precursor to the 1990 Act, was the product of
a changing philosophy on the policy for Indian treatment in
32

The U.S. Secretary of the Interior commissioned “The Problem of Indian
Administration,” more commonly known as the “Meriam Report,” to study conditions of
Indian communities forty years after the General Allotment Act failed to promote
assimilation among Indian groups. The first sentence of the report reads: “[a]n
overwhelming majority of the Indians are poor, even extremely poor, and they are not
adjusted to the economic and social system of the dominant white civilization.” The
Miriam Report, http://www.skc.edu/netbook/09-IRA.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2006).
33
See WILLIAM THOMPSON, NATIVE AMERICAN ISSUES: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 99
(1996).
34
See id.
35
See Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1935, ch. 748, § 2, 49 Stat. 891, 892 (current
version at 25 U.S.C. § 305a (2000)).
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America, from one of forced assimilation and allotment to one of
self-sufficiency and autonomy.36 While the 1935 Act did include
fines for misappropriating the Boards’ marks, the Board did not
initiate a single case in the first 50 years of its existence.37
B. Determining Indianness and the Indian Gap
Definitions of Indians and Indian tribes in the United States are
political determinations, bestowed by federal and state law based
on rules of membership.38 Federal and state statutes determine
which people and groups are part of a “quasi-sovereign
relationship” with the U.S government and are eligible for various
governmental programs.39 Cohen’s Handbook on Federal Indian
Law explains that “[t]he term Indian may be used in an
ethnological or in a legal sense . . . [but] the federal government is
dealing with members or descendants of political entities, that is,
Indian tribes, not with persons of a particular race.”40 Since tribal
membership is the “essential” element in determining Indianness,
“a person of complete Indian ancestry who has never had relations
with any Indian tribe may be considered a non-Indian for some
legal purposes.”41 Hence, the IACA determines whether a product
is an “Indian product” based on whether the product’s maker is an
36

After efforts to “Americanize” the Indians through a system of land allotment and
educational reforms failed, authorities turned to other methods in their effort to solve the
“Indian Problem” of poverty, disease, and illiteracy. After Franklin D. Roosevelt
assumed the presidency, he installed Indian reformer John Collier as Commissioner of
the Bureau of Indian Affairs. As part of the Indian New Deal, Collier promoted Indian
mobility, property rights, tribal self-governance, and restoration of Indian cultural and
religious heritage, in stark contrast to the policies of assimilation and allotment that had
ruled the day prior to that time. The cornerstone of Collier’s work, the Indian
Reorganization Act of 1934, abandoned the land allotment system and renewed Indian
political and social structures, leading the way for the efforts of economic betterment
posited by the Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1935. See ROBERT E. LESTER, A GUIDE TO
THE MICROFILM EDITION OF NATIVE AMERICANS AND THE NEW DEAL: THE OFFICE FILES
OF JOHN COLLIER, 1933–1945, at v (1994).
37
See SHEFFIELD, supra note 21, at 16.
38
See generally id. at 32–38 (noting that the extent of Native American tribal
sovereignty and its interplay with state and federal law have varied throughout the course
of American history).
39
See id. at 4.
40
RENNARD STRICKLAND ET. AL., FELIX S. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN
LAW 19 (1982 ed.).
41
Id.
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“Indian” using only the political measure of tribal enrollment,
without regard to the individual’s sense of his ancestral past.42
The problem with this narrow measure of Indianness is that
political demarcation does not necessarily comport with
perceptions of Indians by individuals who self-identify as Indian,
Indian and non-Indian artisans, or consumers. Gail Sheffield, who
has written the seminal work on the IACA,43 elucidates,
“[w]hereas the [IACA] speaks to an ethnic activity—the selfidentification of an artist in the promotion and sale of his or her
work—enrollment in a tribe is a political act or status, although it
may be simultaneously an ethnic act as well.”44
The IACA only considers individuals who are members of
federal or state recognized tribes, or who are certified as artisans
by an Indian tribe, “Indian.”45 Such individuals are thus the only
people who may label their goods as “Indian-made.”46 In essence,
“[w]hen it comes to making and selling Indian arts and crafts, a
non-enrolled Indian ceases to be Indian.”47
Seeking enrollment for currently non-enrolled Indians,
however, is not easy. Both historically and today, the system of
governmental recognition of Indian status and Indian tribes is
fraught with problems of arbitrariness,48 policies of assimilation
and termination,49 and logistical hurdles for Indian groups seeking
recognition.50 Fraud perpetuated by people and groups hoping to
claim land allotments likely causes further government distrust of
claimed “lost” tribes.51 As such, the current system of tribal
recognition places a heavy burden on any tribe applying for
42
See 25 C.F.R. § 309.2(a) (2006) (“Indian as applied to an individual means a person
who is a member of an Indian tribe or for purposes of this part is certified by an Indian
tribe as a non-member Indian artisan . . . .”); 25 C.F.R. § 309.2(d)(1) (2006) (“The term
‘Indian product’ means any art or craft product made by an Indian.”).
43
See SHEFFIELD, supra note 21.
44
Id. at 4.
45
25 C.F.R. § 309.2.
46
Id.
47
Hapiuk, supra note 7, at 1012.
48
See SHEFFIELD, supra note 21, at 56.
49
See id. at 60.
50
See id. at 61 (“Fairly or unfairly, the Branch of Acknowledgement and Research has
been criticized for various alleged shortcomings.”).
51
See id. at 106.
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governmental recognition to demonstrate its roots existed from
“time immemorial.”52 Eligibility requirements for a tribe include
proving:
(1) that it has existed from historic times until the present
on a continuous basis and that it has been identified as
Indian by various outside sources; (2) that most of its
members inhabit a community or specific locale and are
descended from members of an Indian tribe that historically
inhabited a certain area; and (3) that it has been
continuously an autonomous entity exercising political
authority over its members.53
Furthermore, the tribe “cannot be composed principally of
members of other tribes or of tribes that Congress has terminated
or otherwise rejected for . . . federal relationship status.”54
Because of these difficult burdens of proof and the expensive,
lengthy and arduous application process, scholars estimate that
only half of potentially eligible groups are actively pursuing tribal
recognition.55
When the government recognizes a tribe, the relationship
between the two entities is one of one government to another, and
the members of the tribe are “enrolled.”56 Each recognized tribe
uses a system to establish identity usually based on blood quantum
and/or descent.57 As part of a policy of tribal autonomy, the
government grants individual tribes the authority to create their
own rules of membership.58 The standards for tribal membership
vary greatly between tribes. To qualify as a Cherokee, for
instance, one only needs to be able to trace an ancestor to someone
on the Dawes roll.59 Other tribes require as much as one-fourth
52

See id. at 57.
Id. at 60–61.
54
Id. at 61 (explaining the requirements of 25 C.F.R. § 83.3 (1993)).
55
See id. at 61 (noting an estimate Frank W. Porter made in 1983).
56
See id. at 4–5.
57
Margo S. Brownell, Who Is an Indian? Searching for an Answer to the Question at
the Core of Federal Indian Law, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 275, 277 (2000–01).
58
See id. at 307.
59
See id. at 310. Congress created the General Allotment Act of 1887 in a twofold
effort to assimilate Indians by turning them into farmers through allotting them pieces of
land, and to free up surplus land for white settlers. Unsurprisingly, not every Indian
53
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Indian blood.60 Differing tribal requirements can lead to obscure
results. Kay WalkingStick aptly notes:
To be a tribal member of the Salish of Montana, for
example, one must have been born on the Salish
reservation. In order to be a Hopi, one’s mother must be a
Hopi tribal member. This means that if your father is Hopi
and your mother is Salish and you were born in Saint
Louis, you cannot be a member of either tribe, even though
you are a full-blooded Native American.61
Further complications, such as changing governmental
recognition practices throughout history, exacerbate the problem of
including all the people Congress intended the IACA to help.62
Authorities estimate that approximately one-third of all American
Indian tribes and Alaskan Native villages are without federal
recognition as Indian tribes as a direct result of U.S. governmental
exertion of plenary power nullifying or refusing the terms of
treaties, or unilaterally terminating or otherwise dissolving the
sovereign rights of individual tribes.63 As a result, even if
someone has the requisite tribal requirements, the hurdles involved
in verifying it may prove prohibitively difficult or even impossible
to overcome.
Additionally, some Indians who could seek tribal recognition
refuse to do so as a matter of principle.64 Political agendas, anger
over past treatment of Indians by the U.S. government, or disgust
signed up, and since the government was doling out goods, some of the people that did
sign up were not in fact Indians. See SHEFFIELD, supra note 21, at 106. This lends
credence to the notion that tribes who use a decent-based identification system related to
recorded names on the Dawes Roll also include many non-Indians under their purview.
See id. at 107.
60
See Brownell, supra note 57, at 309–10.
61
Kay WalkingStick, Democracy, Inc.: Kay WalkingStick on Indian Law, ARTFORUM,
Nov. 1991, at 20, 20–21.
62
In 1953, the Eisenhower Administration used termination policies to terminate
federal recognition of a number of tribes. Not all of these tribes have been re-recognized
to date, again placing clearly Indian citizens outside the scope of protection under the
Indian Arts and Craft Act of 1990. See THOMPSON, supra note 33, at 119; Joanne Barker,
Indian™ USA, 18 WICAZO SA REVIEW, Spring 2003, at 25, 50–51.
63
Barker, supra note 62, at 55.
64
See Dianna Hunt, Native Texans; Tribal Lawsuits Stake Claims to Most of Texas; An
Indian? It Depends, HOUS. CHRON., June 26, 1994, at A11.
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at the idea that a person must prove that he is what he already
knows himself to be may motivate such a refusal.65 Kenneth Ryan,
an Assiniboine in Montana, expressed this sentiment when he
declared before a gathering of Indian leaders in Oklahoma in 1993
that, “American Indians, horses, and dogs are the only warmblooded mammals in the world who have to carry papers to show
who they are.”66
Gail Sheffield argues that “[t]he political nature of tribal status
is one step removed from considerations of ‘ethnicity’; reapply the
political definitions to a sphere such as art and they are two steps
removed, an arbitrary process that creates arbitrary effects.”67
Employing such “arbitrary” and exclusive definitions produces
some substantial risks: First, potential emotional repercussions
exist for those excluded from governmental classification of an
Indian if one’s sense of self does not comport with one’s political
demarcation. Second, there exists the practical and economic risk
that the crafts produced by the class of individuals who can label
their crafts as “Indian” under the IACA may not comport with the
class of crafts (either over or under-exclusively) that consumers
may want to purchase.68
II. THE COUNTERFEIT INDIAN GOODS PROBLEM
A. Hungry for a Piece of Indian Culture
With growing consumerism and tourism, as well as the advent
of the New Age movement and burgeoning interest in Native
American art, the 1970s and 1980s became a time of exponential
65

See id.
Id. (Kenneth Ryan is also a college professor).
67
SHEFFIELD, supra note 21, at 5.
68
One should note that the IACA does grant authority to state and federally recognized
tribes to certify artisans who are not able or do not want to enroll in the tribes. See 25
C.F.R. § 309.2(a) (2006). Sheffield notes that “it is not clear how the two powers, that of
the sovereign right to determine membership and that of the statutory authority to certify
nonmembers, will interact.” SHEFFIELD, supra note 21, at 49. Such a system may solve
some of the problems associated with defining Indianness that this Note outlines, but
certification of an artisan nevertheless remains dependent on acceptance by a tribe rather
than on an independent self-determination of Indianness.
66
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growth for Indian arts and crafts from a small tourist market into a
multi-million dollar industry.69 Sources estimated that in 1985 the
industry garnered approximately $800 million a year in gross
sales,70 while by 2000, the industry generated over $1 billion in
sales.71
The growth of consumer desire for Indian goods and the
corresponding increase in supply of Indian art and commerce,
however, were accompanied by the appearance of increasing
amounts of counterfeit art on the market.72 Overseas factories
manufacture much of this counterfeit art using inauthentic
materials and procedures, thereby producing poorly-made
products.73 Authorities estimate that more than half of the goods
marketed as Indian in origin could be counterfeit, meaning that
Native American artisans are losing over half a billion dollars a
year at the hands of fraudulent sellers who sell their imitation
goods as “the real thing.”74
The problems that the presence of imitation art in the
marketplace creates are (at least) four-fold. First, fake crafts
deprive Indian artisans and communities of much needed income
and contribute to increased economic hardship in Indian
communities.75 Imitation goods are in direct competition with
Indian goods, as they can appear more desirable to consumers
since they are usually cheaper and are accessible in a wide range of
venues, such as hotel gift shops, roadside tourist stops, and
powwows.76 This is especially problematic because the arts and
69

Parsley, supra note 5.
Id.
71
See S. REP. NO. 106-452, at 1 (2000), reprinted in 2000 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2123, 2123
(citing John Shiffman, $1 Billion Industry Reeling as Faux Crafts Flood Market, USA
TODAY, Apr. 8, 1998, at A2; James Brooke, American Indian Crafts Loose Native Edge
as Foreign Fakes Flourish, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Aug. 4, 1997, at 11).
72
See Hapiuk, supra note 7, at 1017.
73
See id.
74
See The Implementation of the Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990: Oversight
Hearing on Pub. L. No. 101-644 Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 106th Cong. 23
(2000) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl).
75
See S. REP. NO. 106-452, at 1–2, reprinted in 2000 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2123, 2123.
76
See generally, Hapiuk, supra note 7, at 1020 (noting that if counterfeit Native
American goods result in lower prices for even authentic Native American goods, the
presence of counterfeits in the market may help consumers more than it hurts them).
70
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crafts industry is a huge source of income for Native American
communities.77 For instance, approximately 85% of the population
in the Zuni Pueblo claims arts and crafts sales as either primary or
secondary sources of income, and assert it has become harder to
sell their work, even when they price their wares at levels lower
than those their goods commanded ten years ago.78 Sources
further estimate that 37% of the Hopi Tribe’s working population
is involved in the arts and crafts industry in some way.79
Second, fake crafts contribute to cultural extinction by
potentially pushing legitimate producers, and hence “authentic”
goods, out of the market.80 If Indian artisans cannot afford to
produce Indian crafts because of the fierce and unfair competition,
tribal cultures and practices as a whole risk eventually dying out.81
Third, fakes decrease consumer confidence in the Indian art
industry.82 Imitation goods may be difficult to differentiate from
authentic goods, resulting in consumers potentially purchasing
counterfeit goods when they believe they are buying legitimate
Indian crafts. Consequently, if consumers doubt that what they are
buying is genuine, this may lead to diminished sales among
prospective buyers who are only interested in purchasing authentic
goods.83
Fourth, imitation crafts in the market are offensive or hurtful to
Indians who are sensitive to the cultural associations many Indian
goods carry with them. While authentic Indian artisans handcraft
their wares from quality materials that take time and skill to hone
into finished products, manufacturers of fake goods frequently
77
See, e.g., Hearing, supra note 74, at 23 (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl) (noting that the
Hopi tribe derives $11.2 million of income from its arts and crafts business).
78
Hearing, supra note 74, at 42 (statement of Tony Eriacho, Jr., Board Member, Indian
Arts and Crafts Assoc.).
79
Hearing, supra note 74, at 23 (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl).
80
See Hapiuk, supra note 7, at 1020. Hapiuk, however, also notes that as long as
drastic decreases in prices do not entirely eradicate legitimate producers from the market,
lower prices may benefit consumers more than they hurt producers, by increasing
consumer choices through providing cheaper substitute goods. Id.
81
See Hapiuk, supra note 7, at 1021.
82
See S. REP. NO. 106-452, at 2 (2000), reprinted in 2000 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2123, 2124;
Hapiuk, supra note 7, at 1020–21.
83
See Hapiuk, supra note 7, at 1020–21. The increasing presence of counterfeits,
however, may also simply drive consumers to become more educated before purchasing.
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utilize inferior materials and methods of craftsmanship that are
often culturally false or misleading, and devoid of the personal
integrity of handcrafted items.84
The invasion of cut-rate
imitations cheapens tribal culture, undermining entire communities
and beliefs.85 More seriously, such creations may violate sociallyconstructed norms and destroy the social order by blasphemously
exposing and defiling sacred knowledge.86
Jodie Bernstein, the Director of the Federal Trade
Commission’s Bureau of Consumer Protection, summed up these
concerns: “[a]uthentic American Indian arts and crafts are prized
for their beauty, originality, and workmanship . . . .
When
counterfeit arts and crafts are sold as authentic, it not only hurts
Tribes and individual artists, but the consumers who don’t get what
they pay for.”87
B. Legislative Reactions to the Counterfeit Indian Goods
Problem: The Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990
Congress enacted the Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990 in an
Indian-focused effort to combat the problems of counterfeit Indian
goods.88 The 1990 Act gave teeth to the 1935 Act by “creating a
private cause of action that enabled injured plaintiffs—sellers of
authentic Indian arts and crafts—to recover substantial damage
awards from violators of the Act.”89 The Indian Arts and Crafts
Act of 1990 is a truth-in-advertising law90 which states: “[i]t is
unlawful to offer or display for sale or sell any good . . . in a
manner that falsely suggests it is Indian produced, an Indian
product, or the product of a particular Indian or Indian tribe or
84

See S. REP. NO. 106-452, at 2 (2000), reprinted in 2000 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2123, 2123–
24; Hapiuk, supra note 7, at 1022.
85
See Hapiuk, supra note 7, at 1021.
86
Michael F. Brown, Can Culture Be Copyrighted?, 39 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 193,
198 (1998).
87
Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, American Indian Arts and Crafts “Surf
Day” (October 24, 2000) (on file with author), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2000/
10/indianart.htm.
88
See Parsley, supra note 5, at 487.
89
Native Am. Arts, Inc. v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 435 F.3d 729, 731 (7th Cir. 2006).
90
Truth-in-Advertising laws are laws that bar advertisers from advertising products in
an unfair or deceptive manner. See 25 C.F.R. § 309.7 (2006).

WOLTZ_GALLEYPROOF_120106.DOC

458

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

1/23/2007 4:40 PM

Vol. 17:443

Indian arts and crafts organization, resident within the United
States.”91 Individual violators of the IACA can face up to $1
million in fines and up to fifteen years in prison for subsequent
violations of this Act.92 To qualify for protection under this Act, a
seller of goods labeled as Indian must be a federally or state
recognized Indian, or recognized by a tribe as an Indian artisan.93
At the hearing before the Committee on Indian Affairs, the
creators of the Act—then-Colorado Senator Ben Nighthorse
Campbell, a former Native artisan himself, and then-Arizona
Senator Jon Kyl—endorsed the legislation.94 The Senate also
invited tribal leaders to testify on behalf of the pending law at this
hearing. Jacob H. Lonetree, President of the Ho-Chunk Nation,
called the Act “vitally important to the protection of Indian artisans
and crafts people,”95 and stated “[t]he Ho-Chunk Nation is proud
of its collaboration with Native American Arts Inc. to pursue the
enforcement of [the A]ct.”96 Clan elders of the Ho-Chunk Nation
further elucidated the connection between the economic viability
of Indian people and the preservation of Indian culture: “[t]hrough
necessity and survival, the native people continue to make crafts
for profit to feed their families, but in all of that, they still look to
the Creator for inspiration and thank Him for the talent, the ideas,
the colors, and the materials to make the Arts and Crafts.”97
Through this explanation they expressed their firm support of the
Act’s mission of trying to secure economic viability for Native
American citizens.
In November of 1996, the IACB released its final regulations
in an effort to help solve ambiguities in interpreting the IACA.98
While these regulations provided answers to some problems, such
as the question of who qualifies for certification as an Indian
91

18 U.S.C. § 1159(a) (2000).
18 U.S.C. § 1159(b)(2) (2000).
93
18 U.S.C. § 1159(c)(1) (2000).
94
See Hearing, supra note 74, at 2 (statement of Sen. Ben Nighthorse Campbell); id. at
22 (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl).
95
Id. at 30 (testimony of Jacob H. Lonetree, President, Ho-Chunk Nation).
96
Id. at 31.
97
Id. at 109 (Written Testimony of Traditional Court (Clan Elders) of Ho-Chunk
Nation).
98
See 25 C.F.R. §§ 309.1–.2, .6–.27 (2006).
92
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artisan,99 they also raised additional concerns. For example, the
Final Regulations forbid the unqualified use of the designation
“Native American,” in addition to the unqualified use of “Indian”
that the statute itself forbids, but allow the use of “Indian-style” or
“Native American-style.”100 Furthermore, the regulations fail to
qualify the definition of “made” in terms of what constitutes
“Indian-made,” and offer no guidance as to how much Indian labor
must, or non-Indian labor may, play a part in the final product to
qualify.101 The Indian Arts and Crafts Enforcement Act of 2000,
billed as “[a]n Act [t]o improve the cause of action for
misrepresentation of Indian arts and crafts”102 added additional
amendments to clarify the language of the 1990 Act.103
The revised Act made notable strides for Indian people by
increasing civil penalties, creating new criminal charges to deter
potential counterfeiters, and extending standing to sue under the
Act to individuals and Indian tribes in addition to the government
attorneys previously authorized to bring such actions.104
Empowering independent parties to refer claims for investigation
helps to expose a greater number of IACA violations,105 establishes
greater social involvement in upholding the Act’s ideals,106 and
reinforces notions of tribal sovereignty.
Equally important is what the Act does not do: as a truth-inadvertising law, the IACA seeks to limit only the way in which
retailers market, advertise, and label goods for sale.107 Advertising
99

25 C.F.R. § 309.4(a) (2006) (limiting those who can be certified to people of Indian
lineage).
100
25 C.F.R. § 309.3(a) (2006). See infra Part II.D for a discussion of the Seventh
Circuit’s interpretation of this regulation.
101
See 25 C.F.R. § 309.2(d) (2006).
102
Indian Arts and Crafts Enforcement Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-497, § 1, 114 Stat.
2219, 2219 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 305e (2000)).
103
Id. § 2, 114 Stat. 2219–20.
104
See Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1935, ch. 748, § 6, 49 Stat. 891, 893 (current
version at 25 U.S.C. § 305e (2000)).
105
Hearing, supra note 74, at 15–16 (statement of Faith Roessel, Chairperson, IACB,
Dep’t of Interior).
106
The IACB has started a toll-free number, 1-888-ART-FAKE, that artists and
consumers can use to file complaints or to obtain more information about fake art. See,
e.g., Diana Marrero, Fakes Grow in Indian Art Market, Experts Say, SIOUX FALLS
ARGUS-LEDGER, May 22, 2006, at A1.
107
See 25 C.F.R. §§ 309.7–.9 (2006).
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methods may include brochures and print advertisements, labeling
of individual goods, or any other commercial representation which
is likely to confuse consumers as to whether Indians made the
goods in question.108 The IACA does not limit creative expression
of artists in designing their products. The distinction between
regulating advertising methods versus artists’ creative expression
is relevant in determining the scope of protection afforded Indian
artisans, as well as the constitutionality of the Act.109 In one of the
first cases brought under the IACA, Native American Arts v.
Village Originals,110 Village Originals, a nationwide operator of
arts and crafts retail stores, challenged the IACA’s constitutional
validity on First Amendment grounds.111 The court rejected
Village Originals’ claim that the IACA regulated the content of its
crafts by prohibiting it from utilizing “Southwest” designs which
oftentimes resemble Native American designs.112 In a strong
defense of the Act, the court noted “[t]o the contrary, IACA does
not restrict the artistic quality of Village Originals’ merchandise.
Rather, it merely regulates the means through which such
merchandise is marketed.”113
C. Implications for Consumers’ Expectations of “Authenticity”
Since the IACA targets only the way artisans can label their
goods, rather than the style used in the creation of the goods, the
success of the Act in decreasing Indian poverty is reliant on
consumers making the “right” choice between Indian and non108

See 18 U.S.C. § 1159(a) (2000); 25 U.S.C. §305e(a) (2000).
See Native Am. Arts, Inc. v. Vill. Originals, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 876, 880–81 (N.D.
Ill. 1998).
110
25 F. Supp. 2d 876.
111
See id. at 880.
112
See id. at 880–81. See also 1 ANNE GILSON LALONDE ET AL., GILSON ON TRADEMARK
PROTECTION AND PRACTICE § 1.03[7][a] (2006 ed.) (“Courts have been wary about
extending trademark law protection to copyrighted material in particular. They appear to
be suspicious of any overlap between trademark and copyright protection, not wanting to
safeguard intellectual property under both schemes and speculating that plaintiffs may be
benefiting unduly from double protection. In fact, courts probably should be concerned
about attempts to plead an essentially copyright-based claim as a Lanham Act claim, too,
and look to the policies of both copyright and trademark law to ensure that one does not
overwhelm the other.”).
113
Vill. Originals, 25 F. Supp. 2d at 880.
109
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Indian goods.114 It is therefore imperative that any choice that
consumers have between “Indian” and “non-Indian” products
comports with consumer notions of what the terms “Indian” and
“non-Indian” signify with respect to their purchase. If the IACA’s
scope is too broad, such that a consumer can still buy what is
purportedly Indian and not get what he or she wants, consumers
will not make purchasing choices based on the demarcations set
out by the IACA. Conversely, if the IACA’s scope is too narrow,
consumers will either purchase goods produced by artisans falling
outside the ambit of the Act—thereby defeating the Act’s
purpose—or will unduly limit their search to products falling under
the Act. The repercussions of such an overly narrow scope would
include decreasing revenue to some arguably deserving artisans as
well as Indian communities at large—again defeating the purpose
of the Act—restricting the pool of products available for purchase,
and encouraging fetishism and increased notions of homogeneity
among Indian groups.
1. What is “Authenticity” Anyway?
What are consumers seeking and what do they think they’re
getting by “buying Indian”? How much of a role does the “Indian”
element play in consumers’ decision to purchase goods? Based on
the large range of consumers—from serious art collectors, to
hobbyists, “wannabe” Indians, New Age hippies, and tourists
visiting Native American communities—there are undoubtedly
varied answers to these questions.115 Scholars speculate that a
general belief—whether misguided or not—that Indian societies
are essentially spiritual and artistic in nature has fueled the
increased consumer demand for Native American goods of the last
few decades.116 Scholars maintain this belief fosters “[t]he current
tendency [of consumers] to “put the ‘sacred,’ the ‘traditional’ the
‘natural’ and ‘artistic’ at the heart of all Indian life [while
overlooking] the commercial, the bureaucratic, the secular, the

114

See Hapiuk, supra note 7, at 1055–56.
See SHEFFIELD, supra note 21, at 88–93; Hapiuk, supra note 7, at 1017.
116
See Hapiuk, supra note 7, at 1022 (quoting BARRY M. PRITZKER, NATIVE AMERICA
TODAY: A GUIDE TO COMMUNITY POLITICS AND CULTURE 3 (1999).
115
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inventive.”117 This tendency to define Indian life, and hence the
arts and crafts created by Indians, as sacred or heavily imbued with
cultural “authenticity” and meaning thus becomes a stand-alone
quality of Indian goods, beyond whatever aesthetic or utilitarian
function they otherwise possess. Such romanticism, however,
likely constitutes an overly simplistic view of the large Indian arts
industry, for it is unmindful of the hurdles and basic market forces
that all sellers face when trying to sell goods in a competitive
marketplace.
“Authenticity” itself is a slippery subject, especially when
dealing with cultural creations. Cultures are, by definition, ever
changing and transforming over generations.118 Because of
movements of people and changes in circumstance, the manner in
which societies pass on cultural elements or practices can change
both substantively, and in terms of the values and mores members
of a culture employ to relate what and how they are thinking,
practicing, performing and otherwise expressing themselves.
Specifically in terms of creating art, where different artisans in a
single community may employ divergent methods, materials, and
rituals to produce the same type of good over many years, who is
to say what the “authentic” way is? Since divergent methods of
production stem from the same vast and ancient “culture,” which
member’s way is best? At what time would one fix “authenticity”?
A fixed conception of authenticity, which makes unrealistic
presumptions regarding temporal change and concurrent variation,
is at odds with the way societies evolve and transmit their cultures.
There likely never was such a thing as one traditional way of
fabricating Indian art.119 While some artisans do certainly draw on
religious or cultural traditions to influence their work, they often
combine such inspiration with western or non-symbolic influences
as well.120 Like any group of suppliers that must tailor its products
to the needs and desires of the market, the Indian arts and crafts

117
118
119
120

Richard White, Representing Indians, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 21, 1997, at 28, 33.
See Brown, supra note 86, at 197.
See Hapiuk, supra note 7, at 1053–54.
See id. at 1054.
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community has undoubtedly changed over time to reflect changing
consumer preferences.121
Furthermore, even if one could deduce a single method of
production for an object at a specific moment in time, it makes
little sense to freeze such an idea as the sole mode of expression.
For one thing, this inhibits innovation moving forward. Secondly,
it fails to account for other “authentic” methods that existed in the
past—or may arise in the future—and presents an incomplete view
of a changing society. Thirdly, the imposition of a rigid formula
would actually make for less authentic products than untouched
organic creation. Such a regime would reduce the act of creation
to the replication of a rote formula, rather than an act of processed
inspiration. As one scholar notes, the most effective means of
“preserving” aspects of an indigenous group’s “culture” do not
generally consist of “locking songs and stories in the strongbox of
‘genuine tradition,’ but in the[] creative application of core cultural
insights to solving the problems presented by evolving historical
contexts.”122
When considering the question of authenticity, it is also worth
asking “authentic as opposed to what?”123 Authenticity is a
concept “whose meaning remains uncertain until we know what
dimension of its referent is being talked about.”124 Denis Dutton
explains that “a forged painting, for example, will not be
inauthentic in every respect: a Han van Meegeren forgery of a
Vermeer is at one and the same time both a fake Vermeer and an
authentic van Meegeren.”125 Dutton draws a further comparison
between “nominal authenticity” and “expressive authenticity,” the
former being simply a correct identification of the author, and the
latter representing an object’s character as the true expression of an
individual’s or a society’s values and beliefs.126 Dutton cautions
purchasers against a strong “temptation to imagine that
121

See id.
Stephen D. Osborne, Protecting Tribal Stories: The Perils of Propertization, 28 AM.
INDIAN L. REV. 203, 236 (2003).
123
Denis Dutton, Authenticity in Art, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF AESTHETICS 258,
(Jerrold Levinson ed., 2003).
124
Id.
125
Id.
126
Id.
122
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ascertaining nominal authenticity will inevitably favor some ‘old’
or ‘original’ object over a later artefact [sic].”127 Because the
IACA allows only artisans who are politically recognized as
“Indian” the right to market their creations as “Indian,” the Act
speaks merely to nominal authenticity, rather than the expressive
authenticity of the arts and crafts sold as Indian-made.128 This is
problematic because it is likely that consumers are more interested
in expressive authenticity than nominal authenticity when it comes
to Indian goods.
When a consumer expresses an interest in purchasing
“authentic” Indian goods, whether a particular seller is recognized
politically as Indian is likely neither necessary nor sufficient to
convince such a buyer that the goods he sells are “authentic.”
Rather, consumers likely view the criteria of “authenticity” as
relating to immeasurable qualities of the goods such as the
meaning imbued in a piece by its creator; the time, effort and
quality of the materials invested in making a piece; the similarity
of a good to ancient, ritual or traditional goods of the same type; or
a sense that the artist somehow incorporated her Indian
experiences and identity into her production of the good.129 By
failing to take into account these relevant factors in consumers’
decisions to purchase Indian goods, the IACA draws an imperfect
divide between what consumers desire and what the framers of the
IACA want consumers to purchase. Artists in the Indian Gap
suffer in two ways: first, the IACA fails to account for them in its
definition of “Indian”; second, they are passed up by consumers
who do not realize that the “Indian” label on goods carries only a
narrow legal and political definition and would otherwise purchase
their goods.
The IACA also fails to account for the nominal/expressive
authenticity distinction in matters of intertribal fraud among
governmentally recognized Indians. In one documented incidence
of intertribal misappropriation, members of the Hopi tribe accused
Navajo manufacturers of creating fake Kachina dolls, Hopi figures

127
128
129

Id.
See 25 U.S.C. § 305e(a) (2000); 18 U.S.C. § 1159(a) (2000).
See Dutton, supra note 123, at 270.
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with no basis in Navajo culture.130 The Navajo producers carved
the dolls from balsa wood, though the Hopi traditionally make the
dolls from cottonwood.131 Though the marketing and sales of such
dolls as authentic Indian products is misrepresentative and
misleading to consumers, under the current IACA, the Hopi
artisans have no recourse against this type of behavior.132 Navajo
producers are free to label such dolls “Indian-made,” since they are
indeed Indians. This loophole exemplifies why legislative reliance
on political categorization alone is insufficient to cure the
counterfeit Indian goods problem and to ensure that consumers get
what they pay for.
D. Judicial Interpretations: Prosecution under the IACA
Despite the longtime existence of the Act, few parties have
referred valid, actionable complaints to the IACB,133 and even
fewer courts have imposed liability under the Act.134 Even more
surprisingly, until 2005, none of these cases reached the appellate
court level.135
Native American Arts Inc., an Indian arts and crafts
organization, brought the first case under the Indian Arts and
Crafts Act when it filed suit against J.C. Penney in May of 1998.136
Another case brought that same year, Native American Arts Inc. v.
Village Originals,137 was the first to recognize that the legislative
history of the IACA indicated that the Act’s “falsely suggests”

130

Mark Shaffer & Bill Donovan, Hopi Kachina Doll Carvers Protest Navajo Replicas,
N.O. TIMES-PICAYUNE , Jan. 30, 1994, at A12.
131
Hapiuk, supra note 7, at 1074.
132
See id. But see Richard A. Guest, Intellectual Property Rights and Native American
Tribes, 20 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 111, at 137–38 (1995–1996) (positing that the Hopi could
bring a claim against the Navajo under the IACA).
133
See Hearing, supra note 74, at 16 (statement of Faith Roessel, Chairperson, IACB,
Dep’t of Interior).
134
See, e.g., Native Am. Arts, Inc. v. Chico Arts, Inc., 8 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1069 (N.D.
Ill. 1998); Native Am. Arts, Inc. v. J.C. Penney Co., 5 F. Supp. 2d 599, 604 (N.D. Ill.
1998) (both holding that Native American Arts did not have standing to sue under the
IACA).
135
See Native Am. Arts, Inc. v. Waldron Corp., 399 F.3d 871, 873 (7th Cir. 2005).
136
See J.C. Penney, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 600.
137
25 F. Supp. 2d 876 (N.D. Ill. 1998).
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clause should be construed as “parallel and analogous” to 15
U.S.C. § 1125, a section of the Lanham Act.138
An Indian Arts and Crafts Act violation is a separate and
distinct claim from a Lanham Act violation.139 A violation of both,
neither, or either is theoretically possible in any given
circumstance.140 In situations involving potentially counterfeit
Indian goods, for instance, plaintiffs have brought cases alleging
only violations of the Indian Arts and Crafts Act, and not the
Lanham Act.141 In 2005 and 2006, however, judges ruling on the
first two appellate court cases brought under the Indian Arts and
Crafts Act nevertheless couched their discussion of the IACA in
Lanham Act terms,142 even though the plaintiffs in these two cases
did not allege Lanham Act violations in the respective lower court
proceedings.143 While these two cases were not the first to note the
clear legislative intent to model the IACA’s use of the phrase
“falsely suggesting” after the Lanham Act,144 the analogous
treatment these courts afford the two statutes is unprecedented.145
While scholarly criticism and commentary surrounding the Act146
138

See id. at 881 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 101-400, pt. 1, at 11 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6382, 6390). See infra Part IV.B for a discussion of the policies that
underlie governmental protection of commercial trademarks in the United States.
139
See Hornell Brewing Co. v. Rosebud Sioux Tribal Ct., 133 F.3d 1087, 1089 (8th Cir.
1998).
140
An imitation of a Silver Hand logo or another other IACB-certified trademark, for
instance, would likely qualify for protection under both the Lanham Act and the IACA.
Where there is no trademark infringement, but only a manner of advertising that is
suggestive of goods being Indian-made, however, protection is only available under the
IACA. Of course, goods can also violate the Lanham Act’s “regular” trademark
protections without deceptive advertising suggesting such wares are Indian-made.
141
See, e.g., Native Am. Arts, Inc., v. Earth Dweller, Ltd., No. 01-C-2370, 2001 WL
910394, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 10, 2001); J.C. Penney, 5 F. Supp. at 600.
142
See Native Am. Arts, Inc. v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 435 F.3d 729, 733–34 (7th Cir.
2006); Native Am. Arts, Inc. v. Waldron Corp., 399 F.3d 871, 873–74 (7th Cir. 2005).
143
See Hartford, 435 F.3d at 730–31; Waldron, 399 F.3d at 873.
144
See Native Am. Arts, Inc. v. Vill. Originals, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 876, 881 (N.D. Ill.
1998) (“House Report 101-400 (I) . . . . further stated that the ‘falsely suggests’ clause
was intended to be construed as parallel and analogous to the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125.” (citing H.R. REP. NO. 101-400, pt. 1, at 11 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6382, 6390)).
145
Compare id., with Hartford, 435 F.3d at 734 (noting that a violation of the IACA
equates with a trademark violation), and Waldron, 399 F.3d at 873 (noting that the IACA
“makes ‘Indian’ the trademark denoting products made by Indians”).
146
See infra Part III.A.
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has for the most part been limited to the cultural implications of the
legislation—who is and who is not allowed to call himself an
Indian, and why this line is arbitrary147—these two cases, both of
which the Seventh Circuit decided, shed light on how courts
interpret and apply the Act from an economic standpoint.148 The
existence of such divergent—or perhaps dovetailing—frameworks
surrounding the same Act demonstrates how authorities must
understand “Indianness” as both a powerful cultural quality and a
potent economic asset, neither of which should be overlooked in
thinking about and applying the IACA.
1. Native American Arts, Inc. v. The Waldron Corporation149
In 2001, Native American Arts, Inc. (“NAA”) sued Earth
Dweller, Ltd. (“Earth Dweller”) for violations of the Indian Arts
and Crafts Act of 1990 and the Indian Arts and Crafts Enforcement
Act of 2000, seeking punitive damages.150 NAA alleged that Earth
Dweller fraudulently offered, displayed and sold goods labeled as
“Indian” that were in truth not Indian-made.151 The district court
refused a jury instruction sought by NAA regarding 25 C.F.R. §
309.24(a),152 which provides that “the unqualified use of the term
‘Indian’ or . . . of the name of an Indian tribe . . . in connection
with an art or craft product is interpreted to mean . . . that . . . [t]he
art or craft product is an Indian product.”153 The trial court
147
See generally SHEFFIELD, supra note 21, at 151 (“[The IACA] confuses or juxtaposes
nonsimilar categories and treats them identically, with no recognition of the possible
divergence of consequences.”); Hapiuk, supra note 7, at 1014 (“[The IACA] is flawed
because it fails to acknowledge the historical development of both Indian tribes and
Indian arts and crafts and to appreciate fully the dialogical ways that contemporary Indian
identity is construed.”); Parsley, supra note 5, at 488 (“Congress, in its attempt to help
Native Americans, has actually stolen the heritage of some Indians and caused massive
infighting among Native Americans residing in the United States”).
148
See Hartford, 435 F.3d at 733–34; Waldron, 399 F.3d at 874.
149
399 F.3d 871 (7th Cir. 2005).
150
Native Am. Arts, Inc., v. Earth Dweller, Ltd., No. 01-C-2370, 2001 WL 910394,
at *1 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 10, 2001).
151
Id. at *1.
152
Waldron, 399 F.3d at 873.
153
25 C.F.R. § 309.24(a) (2006). 25 C.F.R. § 309.24(a) is one of the regulations that
“define[s] the nature and Indian origin” of the goods the IACA protects “from false
representations” and details how the IACB “interpret[s] certain conduct for enforcement
purposes. 25 C.F.R. § 309.1 (2006).
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reasoned that such a regulation was inconsistent with the plain
language of the IACA,154 “too far reaching in its regulation of
commercial speech,”155 and too vague to adequately instruct
someone looking to follow the regulation how to “qualify” his or
her use of the term “Indian.”156
NAA took issue with the district court’s finding in favor of the
defendants as well as the jury’s verdict and moved for a new trial,
arguing that the district court erred in refusing the jury instructions
NAA sought pertaining to 25 C.F.R. § 309.24(a).157 When the
district court denied NAA’s request for a new trial, NAA appealed
to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.158 NAA argued
that the district court should not have refused to base an instruction
to the jury on the regulation on the grounds of the regulation’s
unconstitutionality, because the court should not have found the
regulation unconstitutional in the first place.159 NAA additionally
disputed the validity of the district court’s ruling that the
“unqualified use” regulation infringed upon freedom of speech and
was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.160
The Seventh Circuit opinion, which Judge Posner wrote,
immediately struck down the district court’s ruling that the
regulation was unconstitutional, noting that if the district court
judge was right, “trademark law would be unconstitutional.”161
The opinion continued: “[i]n effect the regulation makes “Indian”
the trademark denoting products made by Indians, just as
‘Roquefort’ denotes a cheese manufactured from sheep’s milk

154
Native Am. Arts, Inc. v. Waldron Corp., No. 01 C 2370, 2004 WL 1687184 at *3
(N.D. Ill. July 23, 2004). Judge Deryeghiayan opined that because unqualified use of the
word “Indian” would not in all cases “falsely suggest” to a consumer that a product was
Indian-made, as the IACA requires for a violation, the differing standards of the IACA
and the regulations the government employs the promulgate could mislead a jury. See id.
155
Id. at *4. The court noted that “[d]efendant’s jewelry was thus artwork and was the
end product of her expression of the various cultures that she learned about. Such speech
is protected even if the jewelry is eventually sold.” Id.
156
Id.
157
Id. at *1.
158
Native Am. Arts, Inc. v. Waldron Corp., 399 F.3d 871, 873 (7th Cir. 2005).
159
Id.
160
Id.
161
Id.
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cured in limestone caves in the Roquefort region of France.”162
The appellate court reasoned:
A non-Indian maker of jewelry designed to look like
jewelry made by Indians is free to advertise the similarity
but if he uses the word “Indian” he must qualify the usage
so that consumers aren’t confused and think they’re buying
not only the kind of jewelry that Indians make, but jewelry
that Indians in fact made.163
The court held that there was no constitutional violation.164
The Seventh Circuit also grappled with the potentially
troubling fact that use of the term “Indian” in connection with faux
Indian goods will not lead to consumer confusion in every case,
and that the term will not be present in every instance where
consumer confusion does exist.165 If a seller labels his goods “not
Indian-made,” for instance, clearly no confusion exists, even
though the word “Indian” is used. Conversely, one can “falsely
suggest” goods are Indian-made in a variety of ways other than
overtly labeling goods “Indian” as Earth Dweller did.166 One may
use the name of a tribe in connection with a good traditionally
made by that tribe (i.e. Navajo Rugs, or Hopi Kachina Dolls). One
may advertise goods having a Southwest design as being
“authentic” without qualification. Additionally, using certain
designs and motifs on the goods themselves, independent of any
advertising or labeling, may be enough to confuse some nondiscerning consumers. In the past, one vendor sold jewelry under
the brand name “Indian Maid,” so that if consumers asked him if
his goods were “Indian-made” he could truthfully respond
“yes.”167 Another seller actually convinced a small village in the

162
Id. at 873–874 (citing 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 19:91 (4th ed. 2004 supp.)).
163
Id. at 874.
164
Id.
165
See id. at 874–75.
166
Id. at 874–75 (“Perhaps the most natural meaning of ‘unqualified use of the term
“Indian”’ or of the name of an Indian tribe is using the word or the name to denote an
Indian product without including a disclaimer, such as ‘Indian style,’ or, more
emphatically, if rather off-putting, ‘not manufactured by Indians.’”).
167
Hapiuk, supra note 7, at 1043–44.
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Philippines to change its name to “Zuni” so that when he built a
factory there to create what he passed off as Indian goods, he could
label them “Made in Zuni,” falsely suggesting such goods were
made in the town of Zuni, New Mexico, which is inhabited by
Indians of the Zuni tribe.168 Of course, in balancing policies of
creative expression, fair business practices, and attempts to deter
sellers of fraudulent goods, the IACA will not and should not
forbid all manners of selling products which may confuse some
consumers, just as the Lanham Act does not bar all brand names
which may confuse some consumers as to a product’s source.169
The Seventh Circuit limited its discussion to the narrow sliver of
possible IACA violations involving the unqualified use of the term
“Indian.”170 Thus, the court made no overbroad generalizations
regarding other types of potentially violative actions by sellers and
manufacturers that have not been challenged under the IACA. The
court also upheld the IACB’s authority to determine what an
“Indian product,”171 and consequently, what an “Indian” is, thereby
helping preserve tribal self-governance.172
The court characterized the “unqualified use” provision as
“policy that will guide [the Board] in deciding whether to refer
matters to the Department of Justice for possible action.”173 The
Seventh Circuit’s opinion concluded that even if the regulation did
govern, it would be pertinent only in a case where there was no
additional context to guide a consumer as to the nature of the
product sold.174 In such a case, asking whether a defendant falsely
suggested it was selling Indian products and asking whether it
failed to qualify its use of the names of Indian tribes would be the
168

Id. at 1044.
See generally Johnson & Johnson * Merck Consumer Pharm. Co. v. SmithKline
Beecham Corp., 960 F.2d 294, 298 (2d Cir. 1992) (“[W]here the plaintiff cannot
demonstrate that a statistically significant part of the commercial audience holds the false
belief allegedly communicated by the challenged advertisement, the plaintiff cannot
establish that it suffered any injury as a result of the advertisement’s message. Without
injury there can be no claim, regardless of commercial context, prior advertising history,
or audience sophistication.”).
170
See Waldron, 399 F.3d at 874–75.
171
Id. at 874.
172
See SHEFFIELD, supra note 21, at 47.
173
Waldron, 399 F.3d at 875.
174
Id.
169
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same thing.175 However, because there was “plenty of context” in
the instant case, it was not just the use of the phrase “Indian” by
the defendant that was responsible for creating consumer
confusion.176 It was, rather, the entire sales package, including
advertising, labeling, and place of sale, that violated the IACA by
suggesting the goods in question were produced by Indians.177 In
ruling that 25 C.F.R. § 309.24(a) is intended to guide a court’s
understanding of the IACA, rather than prescribe a method of
determining whether consumers are likely to be confused, the court
preserved a flexible measure for determining whether consumer
confusion is likely to occur based on the facts and circumstances of
a given case.178
The significance of the Seventh Circuit’s opinion is two-fold.
First, the analogy between trademark law and the IACA evidences
how the court expects that representations of Indianness, when
affixed to goods, operate in the minds of consumers.179 Second,
the court’s recognition that the authority of the IACB to determine
what constitutes an “Indian product” does not bestow upon the
Board the power to determine what constitutes consumer
confusion, helps define the role of the regulations in what is
ultimately, as applied by the court, a trademark-like “consumer
confusion” analysis.180 Such a rule helps maintain flexibility and
thoughtfulness. In any event, a rule that unqualified use of the
term “Indian” affixed to goods creates consumer confusion as a
matter of law, and thus constitutes an IACA violation, would be
out of touch with the needs of advertisers and the realities of
consumer perception in many instances.181 Supporting this
175

Id.
Id.
177
Id.
178
Id. at 874.
179
Id. at 873–74.
180
Id. at 874.
181
The Court appeared sensitive to the difficult issue of what the “baseline” should be
regarding what the term “falsely suggests” means to the average consumer:
The instruction might have said that the name of a tribe suggests an Indian
product unless the context rebuts the suggestion. But the difference between
this formula and the statutory “falsely suggests,” which were it not for the
regulation would allow a jury to award a verdict to a defendant even if the
name of the tribe was not qualified, is probably too fine to sway a jury.
176
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practical concern, the Lanham Act permits fair use of even the
most protected trademarks by parties other than the trademark
owner, for instance, in the context of informational advertising.182
2. Native American Arts, Inc. v. Hartford Casualty Insurance
Co.183
The second appellate court case to address a potential Indian
Arts and Crafts Act violation was Native American Arts Inc. v.
Hartford Casualty Insurance Co.184 This case began in 2001 when
Native American Arts, Inc. (“NAA”) sued Stravina Operating
Company (“Stravina”) for a violation of the IACA.185 NAA
alleged that Bloom Brothers and Artistic Impressions, two
divisions of Stravina, manufactured and sold inauthentic Native
American crafts and jewelry in violation of the IACA.186 NAA
claimed that Stravina deceived the public and harmed legitimate
Indian artisans by selling its products in a way that falsely
suggested the products were Indian-made.187 Stravina asked its
insurers, Hartford Casualty Insurance Co. (“Hartford”), to defend
Stravina against NAA’s claims, but Hartford refused.188 NAA and
Stravina settled the case, and as part of the settlement, Stravina
assigned NAA its rights under the insurance policy.189 NAA
subsequently brought an action against Hartford alleging that
Hartford had breached its duty to defend Stravina in the original
lawsuit.190
Id. at 875.
182
See 2 ANNE GILSON LALONDE ET AL., GILSON ON TRADEMARK PROTECTION &
PRACTICE § 5.09[3] (2006 ed.) (“A trademark is not, after all, a right ‘in gross’ which is
protectible in the abstract against any and all use by others irrespective of a lack of
likelihood of confusion. In these circumstances, the courts weigh the right of a business
to inform the public through advertising against the right of the public to be free from
deception and confusion, and draw a line between collateral, informational use of a
competitor’s trademark and infringing use, i.e., that which causes likelihood of
confusion.”).
183
435 F.3d 729 (7th Cir. 2006).
184
See id. at 731.
185
Id. at 730.
186
Id.
187
Id. at 730–31.
188
Id. at 731.
189
Id.
190
Id.
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The basis upon which Hartford had refused to defend Stravina
in the lawsuit was that the policy did not obligate Hartford to
defend Stravina against claims based on the Indian Arts and Crafts
Act.191 Hartford argued that an Indian Arts and Crafts Act
violation fell under two distinct exceptions to the general rule of
coverage for an “advertising injury” under the terms of the
insurance policy.192 First, Hartford claimed that marking one’s
goods as “Indian” did not constitute an advertisement because use
of the word fell under a general exception for “the design, printed
material, information or images contained in, on or upon the
packaging or labeling of any goods or products.”193 Second,
Hartford maintained that the violation NAA alleged was an
“‘advertising injury’ arising out of [the] infringement of [a]
trademark, trade name, service mark or other designation of origin
or authenticity”194 or, more generally, an injury “[a]rising out of
any violation of any intellectual property rights, such as patent,
trade secret, trademark, trade name, service mark or other
designation of origin or authenticity,”195 which sufficiently
exempted Hartford from its duty to indemnify or defend.196
The court rejected Hartford’s first defense, holding that
Stravina’s violated the IACA not only by mislabeling goods but
191

Id.
Id. at 732. “Stravina’s policy read: ‘We will pay those sums that the insured
becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of “personal injury” or “advertising
injury” to which this insurance applies. We will have the right and duty to defend any
“suit” seeking those damages.’” Id. (quoting Stravina’s insurance policy). The policy
defined “advertising injury” as:
a. Oral or written publication of material in your “advertisement” that slanders
or libels a person or disparages a person’s or organization’s goods, products or
services;
b. Oral or written publication of material in your “advertisement” that violates a
person’s right of privacy;
c. Copying, in your “advertisement,” a person’s or organization’s “advertising
idea” or style of “advertisement”; or
d. Infringement of copyright, slogan, or title of any literary or artistic work, in
your “advertisement.”
Id. (quoting Stravina’s insurance policy).
193
Id.
194
Id. at 733 (quoting the policy providing Stravina’s insurance coverage from 1999 to
2001).
195
Id. (quoting the policy providing Stravina’s insurance coverage from 2001 to 2003).
196
Id.
192

WOLTZ_GALLEYPROOF_120106.DOC

474

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

1/23/2007 4:40 PM

Vol. 17:443

also through advertising activity and marketing methods, which
included
distributing
misrepresentative
catalogues
and
197
brochures.
Since NAA’s advertisements stressed the
authenticity of their goods, by falsely doing the same, Stravina’s
advertisements copied NAA’s “style of advertisement,” which was
covered under the policy.198 The court held that Stravina’s actions
therefore constituted an “advertising injury” against which
Hartford had a duty to defend.199
The court, however, found Hartford’s second defense
persuasive.200 While NAA attempted to argue that this exception
applied narrowly to Lanham Act claims—and since NAA did not
allege any Lanham Act complaints, neither the trademark nor the
“origin or authenticity” exclusion applied201—the Court rejected
this view.202 The court explained that applying the exceptions
narrowly to trademark violations “would do serious violence” to
the language of the policy.203 NAA’s allegations of false
representations of “Indianness” fell squarely within the
“designation of origin or authenticity” of Stravina’s products.204
The court reasoned that alternatively, even if the exclusion from
coverage was limited to traditional forms of intellectual property
such as trademarks, NAA’s claim would still fail because of the
IACA’s “trademark-like” qualities.205 The court thus affirmed
Hartford’s motion for summary judgment.206
The significance of this outcome is that it clarifies the court’s
understanding of the IACA by forcing it to define what the IACA
means. When the court categorized the IACA as a trademark
statute, it implied that one’s ability to call one’s self “Indian” is not
so much an expression of culture as an advertisement of it; it is an
asset one can use for commercial gain rather than a means of
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206

Id. at 732–33.
Id. at 733.
Id.
Id. at 733–34.
Id. at 733.
Id. at 734.
Id. at 733.
Id. at 734.
Id.
Id. at 735.
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establishing cultural identity.
The Court expressed this
understanding when it opined that in misrepresenting its goods as
Indian, Stravina “traded upon a reputation, history, and sales
advantage that it did not deserve. . . . and took sales away from
those whose heritage gives them the right to capitalize on the
market value and goodwill associated with authentic, Native
American-made products.”207
The categorization of the IACA as a trademark law further
indicates how Courts conceive the Act as functioning in practice.
As in Waldron, the Hartford court recognized that contextual clues
relating to the style of advertising, rather than sellers affixing
“Indian” labels to the goods in question, are often responsible for
causing consumer confusion over the authenticity of Indian
goods.208 The Hartford court even referenced the Waldron case
when it reaffirmed that as a functional matter, the IACA and its
implementing regulation, 25 C.F.R. § 309.24(a), make “Indian” a
trademark denoting products made by Indians, and concurred that
the Lanham Act ought to guide jurisprudential analysis of the
IACA.209 By moving its focus on the Act from one questioning the
labeling rights of artisans to one pondering how consumers will
view labels of Indian authenticity, the court adopts a consumerfocused analysis of the Act.
The Waldron and Hartford courts demonstrate that the
differences between trademark provisions and the IACA are
dwindling in the minds of the judiciary. But does this consumerdriven analysis, indicating that judges interpret the IACA as
intended to protect consumers rather than Indian communities,
conflict with the initially expressed purpose of the Act as
envisioned by Congress in 1935 and 1990? The next part will
discuss the two main reasons why the merging of these two areas
of law, while convenient, may prove problematic.
207

Id. at 733. For a discussion of this right to capitalize, see Brown, supra note 86, at
194. The Hartford court was not the first court to suggest that cultural groups possess an
inherent property right in collective cultural innovations and creations. See, e.g., Indrogo
v. U.S. Army, 18 F. Supp. 2d 25, 27–28 (D.D.C. 1998) (holding that individuals who
have no ties to any Indian tribe lack standing to bring a claim for the repatriation of
Native American remains).
208
Hartford, 435 F.3d at 733.
209
Id. at 734.
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III. A CULTURAL AND ECONOMIC ASSET
A. A New Perspective: Why the Indian Arts and Crafts Act of
1990 is Not a Cultural Heritage Law
In the sixteen years since Congress enacted the IACA,
speculation that the goal of the Act was to preserve Indian cultural
heritage has fueled most of the commentary on the statute.210
Native American congressmen, after all, promoted the Act211 in
response to an Indian outcry regarding the lack of enforcement of
the 1935 version of the Act.212
It is puzzling, then, that in recent litigation involving the Act,
Courts have viewed IACA violations as analogous to trademark
violations, ruling with a policy toward consumer protection from
confusion, rather than Indian protection from the existence of
fakes.213 Furthermore, the government markets the IACA as a
“truth-in-advertising” law—the policies of which focus on
protecting consumers rather than creators.214 Critics seem justified
in criticizing the act for failing as a cultural heritage act: in
practice, the IACA does not do an adequate job of protecting
Indians—especially
those
in
the
Indian
Gap—from
misrepresentation at the hands of non-Indians, or in some cases,
even at the hands of Indians outside of their tribe.215 Cultural
misappropriation has not ceased, it has merely taken a less obvious
form. Perhaps critics are merely off beam regarding what the law
is trying to accomplish. Perhaps the purpose of the Act is not to
protect cultural heritage, but rather to secure economic viability for
210

Hapiuk deems the IACA “‘a legal regime designed to ensure cultural survival.’” See,
e.g., Hapiuk, supra note 7, at 1044 (asserting one can construe the IACA as “a legal
regime designed to ensure ‘cultural survival’”); Antonia De Meo, More Effective
Protection for Native American Cultural Property Through Regulation of Export, 19 AM.
INDIAN L. REV. 1, 52 (1994) (classifying the IACA as a “cultural property” law).
211
Parsley, supra note 5, at 493 & nn.64–65.
212
See id. at 493 (citing To Expand the Powers of the Indian Arts and Crafts Board:
Hearing on H.R. 2006 Before the H. Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 101st Cong.
65 (1989) (statement of Rep. Jon Kyl)).
213
See Hartford, 435 F.3d at 733, Native Am. Arts, Inc. v. Waldron Corp., 399 F.3d
871, 874 (7th Cir. 2005).
214
See 16 C.F.R. § 0.17 (2006); 25 C.F.R. § 309.7 (2006).
215
See Hapiuk, supra note 7, at 1072–74.
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an economically underdeveloped community. In this case, an
analysis based on the IACA’s failure to preserve cultural heritage
by using an economic measure misses a fundamental principle.
The Act itself is vague in its purpose. The full title of the
legislation that eventually became the Indian Arts and Crafts Act
of 1990 reads, “[a]n [a]ct to expand the powers of the Indian Arts
and Crafts Board, and for other purposes,”216 while the Indian Arts
and Crafts Enforcement Act of 2000 bills itself as “[a]n [a]ct to
improve the cause of action for misrepresentation of Indian arts
and crafts.”217
In light of the impetus for the 1935 Act and the explicit
responsibilities given to the IACB,218 however, it seems that the
preservation of cultural heritage, if any, that results from the Act is
merely a byproduct of the Act’s original intent: to improve the
economic status of Indian communities.219 One finds further
evidence for this hypothesis when one considers the ease with
which Congress could have crafted a cultural misrepresentation
provision, and the legislative silence regarding inter-tribal
misrepresentation.220
If economic improvement is indeed the purpose of the Act,
then it should come as no surprise that the ultimate beneficiaries of
the Act are consumers of Indian goods and politically recognized
Indians, while the Act leaves those in the Indian Gap only slightly

216

Pub. L. No. 101-644, 104 Stat. 4662, 4662 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C.
§§ 305, 305d, 305e (2000)).
217
Pub. L. No. 106-497, 114 Stat. 2219, 2219 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 305e
(2000)).
218
These responsibilities include “promoting the development of American Indian and
Alaska Native arts and crafts, improving the economic status of members of Federallyrecognized tribes, and helping to establish and expand marketing opportunities for arts
and crafts produced by American Indians and Alaska Natives.” Protection for Products of
Indian Art and Craftsmanship, 61 Fed. Reg. 54,551, 54,551–52 (Oct. 21, 1996)
(supplementary background information for regulations to be codified at 25 C.F.R. pt.
309).
219
Of course, it is impossible to have “authentic” goods without some culture to
authenticate, but economic wellbeing and cultural wellbeing are not always exclusively
synonymous.
220
For an example of inter-tribal misrepresentation, see Hapiuk, supra note 7, at 1073–
74.
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better off, if it assists them at all.221 It follows, then, that while the
Act may not be fair to some because of its limited definition of
Indianness, criticism of the Act’s failure to address further
concerns that Native Americans have about their identity and its
portrayal in society at large is unfair.
Certainly, it may be a valid criticism that the Indian arts
counterfeit problem should have been solved by means of a
cultural heritage law, one that focused on preserving the heritage
of Indians, which would have likely included an economic
component.222 There is no doubt that the economic bolstering of
Indians will in some way affect cultural change, no matter how one
delineates what it takes to qualify as an Indian.223 Indians stuck in
the Indian Gap are unlikely to find solace in this Act so long as the
statutory definition of Indian remains rooted purely in politics; for
as long as the Act precludes Indian Gap Indians from qualifying as
Indians, they cannot benefit from the consumer protection
restrictions the Act affords.224 Unaccounted for as either Indians
or consumers, such Indians are not only arbitrary under the Act;
they are invisible.
B. Indian v. Knock-off: The Only Dichotomy?
The prohibition against a non-enrolled artisan labeling his
goods as Indian-made, coupled with consumer desire for
expressive over nominal authenticity, results in a peculiar tension
when it comes to goods made by artisans who fall into the Indian
Gap. Products made by this group are neither “Indian” in the sense
of being made by an enrolled Indian nor knockoffs in the sense of
being factory-made overseas. The current binary conception of the
IACA—under which a product is either Indian-made or
counterfeit—treats products produced by Indians in the Indian Gap

221

See Hapiuk, supra note 7, at 1013, 1028, 1056.
See id. at 1021–22.
223
Can one not conversely argue that laws everywhere have a cultural heritage aspect to
them, though in most instances it is the majority culture’s preservation at stake? See id. at
1059 (“Now to be sure, many ‘tribes,’ in both the ethnological and the political sense, had
existed long before this articulation by the Supreme Court—and well before 1492.”).
224
See id. at 1013, 1056.
222
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as counterfeit,225 despite the fact that in many circumstances
consumers, based on their notions of “authenticity” and cultural
heritage, would conceive of such wares as falling under the
“Indian” category.226 Therefore, while consumers would likely
want to purchase such goods, and such artisans would want to sell
them, the rigid statutory terms of the IACA frustrate both
parties.227
One should also remember that not all enrolled Indians create
goods that consumers would consider “authentic.”228 Thus,
between the number of “fraudulent Indians” who the Act
recognizes as members of Indian tribes, and the number of nonenrolled individuals who identify themselves as Indians but cannot
or will not seek recognition, the IACA proves to be both overinclusive and under-inclusive in terms of its classification of
artisans capable or willing to create “authentic” Indian arts and
crafts that consumers would be interested in purchasing. The
IACA takes a flat view of “Indianness” as an economic asset, and
forgets that it has powerful identity importance to those individuals
who use the term “Indian” to describe who they are.229 The United
States needs a better solution to the counterfeit Indian goods
problem.
The next part of this Note discusses necessary
considerations for constructing such a better solution.
IV. THE PROBLEM WITH LEGAL ANALOGIES
A. The Use of Intellectual Property Rights in Matters of Cultural
Heritage
Using the western notion of trademarks to solve what more
conventional means likely should have already solved is not as
radical an idea as one may think. Over the course of the last few
225

See 18 U.S.C. § 1159; 25 U.S.C. § 305e; Hapiuk, supra note 7, at 1013.
See Hapiuk, supra note 7, at 1056.
227
See id.
228
See id. at 1074. As demonstrated supra, the mere fact that a Native American creates
goods does not verify he uses authentic materials or methods, or that his works are not
culturally misrepresentative in other ways.
229
See id. at 1014, 1031–32.
226
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decades, both attorneys and anthropologists have advocated using
intellectual property rights to assist in preserving issues of cultural
heritage for indigenous groups.230 In the international context, this
has begun to prove successful.231 In the United States, however,
using copyright and patent law to protect elements of cultural
heritage remains a largely unproven practice because of the many
practical implementation problems of such regimes.232
1. Legal Analogy to Intellectual Property Regimes May Lead
to Absurd Results in Cultural Heritage Contexts
One of the problems with creating new areas of legal rights by
analogy is that “they tend to impose a mature, elaborated system
on what may well be an unformulated situation.”233 Existing legal
regimes, specifically older ones, evolved over time according to a
complex blend of considerations in an attempt to balance policy;
fairness; practical and technological limitations on enforcement;
historical or traditional practices; and impact on special interest
groups. Blindly applying an existing legal regime to solve a new
legal problem—such as applying trademark law to cure the
counterfeit Indian goods problem—therefore fails to account for
230
For a broad introduction, see, for example, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS FOR
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: A SOURCEBOOK (Tom Greaves ed., 1994). For more in-depth
studies, see, for example, Michael F. Brown, supra note 86; MICHAEL F. BROWN, WHO
OWNS NATIVE CULTURE? (2003), or ROSEMARY COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES: AUTHORSHIP, APPROPRIATION AND THE LAW (1998).
231
See Bulun Bulun v. R & T Textiles Pty. (1998) 86 F.C.R. 244, 262–63 (Austl.)
(finding in favor of aboriginal artists in their copyright infringement suit against
Australian manufacturers and retailers who used the artists’ folkloric designs on textiles).
232
Such practical problems abound. The limited monopolies that copyright and patent
law authorize conflict with proponents of cultural heritage protection, who seek unlimited
temporal preservation. But see Susan Scafidi, Intellectual Property and Cultural
Products, 81 B.U. L. REV. 793, 796 (2001) (“[I]ntellectual property law, through
modification of its authorial and temporal limitations and creation of community-specific
protections such as an ‘authenticity mark,’ has the potential to strike an equitable balance
between source community rights and the public interest in cultural products.”).
Additionally, the requirements of the American copyright and patent schemes that a work
must be attributable to a single author who created the work or reduced an idea to
practice at a specifically-defined moment in time ignore the fact that cultural creations
are necessarily the product of the work of many authors or creators over an extended span
of time. See id. at 795.
233
Peter L. Felcher & Edward L. Rubin, The Descendibilty of the Right of Publicity: Is
There Commercial Life After Death?, 89 YALE L.J. 1125, 1127 (1980).
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the considerations which significantly shaped the existing regime
in the first place. Such application may lead to at best
unpredictable, and at worst unwanted, results.
Specifically, using intellectual property regimes to remedy
cultural heritage problems has not proven in practice to be the
cure-all it may be in theory. Michael F. Brown, a scholar who has
written extensively on the subject of misapplication of intellectual
property regimes in the cultural heritage context,234 observes:
[T]he debate over intangible cultural property as it has been
conducted by anthropologists, legal scholars, and
indigenous activists has tended toward a polemical
romanticism that produces memorable bumper-sticker
slogans (“Give the natives their culture back!”) but little in
the way of sober reflection on the difficult balancing act
required to formulate policies that provide reasonable
protection for minority populations while maintaining the
flow of information essential to a liberal democracy.235
Brown argues that such proposals to expand the notion of
copyright to defend indigenous cultures “are often formed by
romantic assumptions that ignore the broader crisis of intellectual
property and the already imperiled status of the public domain.”236
Brown instead posits that effective policies for thinking about
indigenous cultural and intellectual property should come from
ideas which are “not only ethically sound but also thoroughly
grounded in the practical realities of cultural creativity,
information storage and transfer, the fluidity of ethnic boundaries,
and the limitations of the judicial process in developed and
developing nations alike.”237
2. Intellectual Property Rights Have Practical Application
Limitations
A second problem with attempting to fit questions of cultural
heritage into existing intellectual property regimes is that this
234
235
236
237

See, e.g., Brown, supra note 86; BROWN, supra note 230.
Brown, supra note 86, at 195.
Id. at 193.
Id. at 195.
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approach fails to adequately meet the needs of those who argue for
absolute preservation of cultural heritage.238 Generally, such
interest groups seek to retain eternal property over their crafts.239
Intellectual property law, however, mandates that such rights must
enter the public domain after the monopolies protecting these
rights for a limited duration expire.240 Such limited monopolies
serve only as means to an end: to provide incentive for invention
and artistic creation.241 The United States Constitution grants
Congress broad power to determine how long such limited
monopolies may last.242 Thus, while ascribing to the “authors” of
certain elements of cultural heritage the bundle of rights that
accompanies intellectual property treatment at first glance appears
to adequately protect such elements, once the limited monopoly
protecting these rights under intellectual property law expires, the
rights themselves effectively expire as well.
That the IACA attempts to address a problem that is not solely
cultural, but economic too, further distorts the balancing test.
“Purely mercantile” cultural heritage conflicts, such as an
agribusiness’ acquisition of native crop varieties for genetic
engineering purposes,243 or the incorporation of indigenous graphic
designs into consumer goods without permission,244 involve only a
single issue: how the native population can seek a fair share of the
profits.245 The counterfeit Indian goods problem, however,
extends well beyond Indian efforts to obtain compensation for lost
profits. But the counterfeit Indian goods crisis can also be
distinguished from other “purely cultural” native grievances, such
as those against the commoditization or publication of sacred or
secret symbols, ideas and motifs that westerners stole or otherwise
238

See id. at 197.
See id.
240
Id. at 196.
241
Id. at 195–96.
242
See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 199–204 (2003) (holding that the Copyright
Term Extension Act’s extension of existing copyrights for an additional twenty years did
not exceed Congress’ power under the Copyright Clause).
243
See Brown, supra note 86, at 195. For a more expansive discussion and examples,
see INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS FOR INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: A SOURCEBOOK (Tom
Greaves ed., 1994).
244
See Brown, supra note 86, at 195.
245
See id.
239
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misappropriated.246 Unlike the offended groups in such cases,
Indian artisans adversely affected by counterfeit iterations of their
goods do not seek a blanket prohibition on the sale of all Indianstyle arts and crafts, Indian arts and crafts of a certain type, or even
goods bearing certain markings, but rather aim to proscribe the sale
only of those goods which are counterfeit relative to their maker.247
Because the counterfeit Indian goods crisis is neither a “purely
mercantile” nor “purely cultural” problem, but falls somewhere in
between, the United States needs an innovative solution that duly
considers assumptions implicit in both models.
3. Cultural Heritage Involves Forms and Notions not
Contemplated by Traditional Intellectual Property Regimes
The cultural offense counterfeit Indian goods pose typifies a
third reason why the use of intellectual property regimes to protect
aspects of cultural heritage is often problematic: while modern
intellectual property law affords to creators rights only to a limited
singular expression of an idea, or particular idea reduced to
practice, expressions of “cultural heritage” encompass ideas and
concepts for which modern intellectual property schemes do not
provide.248
Furthermore, fundamental differences between western and
indigenous cultural perspectives concerning how freely
information ought to flow—and to whom it should flow—pose a
particular problem in protecting cultural heritage through
intellectual property regimes.249 Situations involving native
notions of sacredness highlight such concerns. Indeed, the
American value of championing free speech and invention, which
justifies the implementation of intellectual property rights, is
oftentimes diametrically opposed to the Native American

246

See id. (noting that such grievances are about obtaining a fair share of the profits).
See 25 C.F.R. § 309.9 (2006) (“A non-Indian can make and sell products in the style
of Indian art or craft products . . . if the non-Indian or other seller does not falsely suggest
to consumers that the products have been made by an Indian.”).
248
See Brown, supra note 86, at 197.
249
See id. at 198 n.11 (noting the “fundamental difference” between the Native
American and Western cultural perspectives on encouraging inquiries regarding the
unknown).
247
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commitment to secrecy concerning sacred matters.250 Similarly,
the current American system grants writings and inventions
intellectual property protection because the law views such
writings and inventions as non-rivalrous and non-exclusive.251 In
contrast, native peoples often view sacred knowledge as “a limited
good that cannot properly exist in several places at once.”252
Brown explains this view, observing that “[r]eligious knowledge
that resides in inappropriate places may find its power diminished
or dangerously distorted, hence the common practice of
compartmentalizing information in order to limit access to the
inner meaning of religious symbols.”253 The misuse of a symbol
imbued with inherent power therefore “is at least an affront to
[believers’] dignity, at worst a dangerous form of blasphemy
capable of unleashing a genuine misfortune.”254
B. Trademarks: The Next Frontier in Indian Reform
In light of current problems with the use of copyright and
patent regimes to encourage cultural heritage preservation, could
trademark law be the solution? Or is the IACA merely the next
chapter in a fruitless search for an intellectual property regime
capable of addressing indigenous concerns? The disparity between
the policies behind the creation of trademark law and the creation
of the IACA suggests that trademark law may not be the answer.
Trademarks developed in response to the needs of consumers
to differentiate between goods and assure a consistent level of
quality.255 The government affords trademarks legal protection
because of the numerous functions they serve in a competitive
marketplace.256 Gilson on Trademark Protection and Practice cites
six such functions:

250

See id. at 198.
See id. at 196.
252
Id. at 197.
253
Id.
254
Id.
255
1 GILSON LALONDE ET AL., supra note 112, § 1.03[3][a]. It is curious then, that
Congress enacted the IACA, a statute that gives trademark-like status to the term
“Indian,” in response to a problem primarily plaguing producers.
256
See id. § 1.03[7][a].
251
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(a) designating the source or origin of a particular product
or service;
(b) denoting a particular standard of quality embodied in
the product or service;
(c) identifying a product or service and distinguishing it
from the products or services of others;
(d) symbolizing the good will of its owner and motivating
consumers to purchase the trademarked product or service;
(e) representing substantial advertising investment and
being treated as a species of property; and
(f) protecting the public from confusion and deception,
insuring that consumers are able to purchase products or
services it wants, and enabling courts to fashion a standard
of acceptable business conduct.257
In contrast, when one differentiates between goods that are
Indian-made and non-Indian-made, one preserves only two of the
aforementioned functions: identifying a product and distinguishing
it from the products of others; and protecting the public from
confusion and deception to ensure consumers that they are able to
purchase the products they want.
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, which forbids sellers from
using “a false designation of origin, or any false description or
representation” in connection with their goods, addresses such
policies.258 The courts in the Waldron and Hartford cases
similarly suggest that calling or labeling goods “Indian” is not
simply a means of brand identification for consumers, but is a
“false designation of origin” under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act.259

257

Id. § 1.03[1].
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2000) (“Any person who, on or in connection with any
goods or services, or any container for goods, uses . . . any false designation of origin,
false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact . . .
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to
be damaged by such act.”).
259
See Native Am. Arts, Inc. v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 435 F.3d 729, 733–34 (7th Cir.
2006); Native Am. Arts, Inc. v. Waldron Corp., 399 F.3d 871, 873–74 (7th Cir. 2005).
258
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The Hartford court states that “[t]he purpose of the Indian Arts and
Crafts Act is to protect consumers and the makers of authentic
Native American goods from false representations of a product’s
‘origin or authenticity.’”260 The analogy the Waldron court coins
likening the “Indian” mark to marks of geographic origin, such as
“Roquefort” to denote a particular cheese made in France,261 serves
as further evidence of courts interpreting IACA violations as §
43(a) violations.262
Both the Waldron and Hartford courts, however, overlook the
unique implications of forbidding a non-enrolled artisan from
using the term “Indian” to describe his product, under the logic that
such a term is a “false designation of origin” when the seller is not
an Indian under the Act.263 Where most suits brought under §
43(a) involve sellers misrepresenting a quality of their goods, cases
brought under the IACA question sellers misrepresenting a quality
about themselves.264 The ability to label one’s goods as Indian is
commercial in the sense that it allows a seller to advertise what he
believes to be desirable about his product and also demand a
greater price for his goods. This narrow view of the purpose of
labeling one’s goods “Indian,” however, ignores a problem of
identity: any restriction a statute imposes on labeling goods Indianmade that does not reference an external legal definition of who
qualifies as “Indian” necessarily and implicitly restricts
individuals’ freedom to call themselves “Indian.” Courts should
not overlook such an identity problem when interpreting and
applying the IACA.
1. False Designation of Indianness as a Lanham Act § 43(a)
260

Hartford, 435 F.3d at 733. The court also references background information
appended to a final rule of the IACB that deems the IACA “‘essentially a truth-inmarketing law designed to prevent, through both civil and criminal sanctions, marketing
of products in a manner that falsely suggests such products are produced by Indians when
the products are not, in fact, made by an Indian as defined by the 1990 Act.’” Id. (quoting
Protection of Products of Indian Art and Craftsmanship, 68 Fed. Reg. 35,164, 35,164
(June 12, 2003) (supplementary background information for regulations to be codified at
25 C.F.R. pt. 309)).
261
Waldron, 399 F.3d at 873–874.
262
See also Hartford, 435 F.3d at 734 (citing Waldron, 399 F.3d at 873–74).
263
See Hartford, 435 F.3d at 733; Waldron, 399 F.3d at 874.
264
See, e.g., Waldron, 399 F.3d at 873.
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Violation
A case of false advertising under § 43(a) requires the
following elements:
(1) A false or misleading statement of fact about a product;
(2) Such statement either deceived, or had the capacity to
deceive a substantial segment of potential consumers;
(3) The deception is material, in that it is likely to influence
the consumer’s purchasing decision;
(4) The product is in interstate commerce; and
(5) The plaintiff has been or is likely to be injured as a
result of the statement at issue.265
Interestingly, the statute does not require the presence of
fraudulent intent.266 Based on these factors, there are a number of
reasons why one should be skeptical about applying § 43(a)
reasoning to the counterfeit Indian goods problem.
a) Can Notions of Self-Identity be “False”?
With regard to the first element, individuals calling themselves
“Indian” when they do not qualify as such under the IACA should
not necessarily constitute a “false” statement, as such a designation
may have cultural or ethnic significance in addition to political
import. “Essential to any claim under section 43(a) of the Lanham
Act is a determination of whether the challenged statement is one
of fact—actionable under section 43(a)—or one of general
opinion—not actionable under section 43(a).”267 The Pizza Hut
court explained that “a statement of fact is one that (1) admits of
being adjudged true or false in a way that (2) admits of empirical
265

See, e.g., Pizza Hut v. Papa John’s Int’l, 227 F.3d 489, 495 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing
Taquino v. Teledyne Monarch Rubber, 893 F.2d 1488, 1500 (5th Cir. 1990); Cooke
Perkiss and Liehe, Inc. v. N. Cal. Collection Serv. Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 246 (9th Cir.
1990)).
266
See, e.g., Alison M. Andrews, Note, Implied Misrepresentations in Advertisements
Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Trademark Act: American Home Products Corp. v.
Johnson & Johnson, 47 ALB. L. REV. 97, 113–14 (1982).
267
Pizza Hut, 227 F.3d at 495–96.
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verification.”268 As discussed above, individuals proclaiming
themselves to be “Indian” may be making false statements in one
context—as in whether one is an “Indian” as defined under the
Act—but not in another.269
Courts should therefore not
automatically deem a non-enrolled individual’s unqualified use of
the term “Indian” false and misleading for purposes of a false
advertising statute.270
Similarly, holding the practice of individuals labeling their
goods “Indian” as potentially violative of § 43(a) implies that
either (1) the fact that a product’s maker was an enrolled Indian is
a quality of a good in itself; or (2) the Indian authenticity which
such a class of persons could provide is a quality that can be
quantified with empirical verification. There is no reason,
however, to presume there is any difference in the quality of goods
made by “Indians” as opposed to “non-Indians,” since “Indian”
goods do not possess common standards of quality,271 in terms of
either craftsmanship272 or the elusive quality of “authenticity.” As
stated, authenticity is an inexact measure of an amorphous idea of
culture that, for various reasons, statutes cannot deem capable of
“empirical verification.”273
268
Id. at 496 (citing Presidio Enters., Inc. v. Warner Bros. Distrib. Corp., 784 F.2d 674,
679 (5th Cir. 1986)).
269
See discussion supra Part I.B.
270
See Native Am. Arts, Inc. v. Waldron Corp., 399 F.3d 871, 874–75 (7th Cir. 2005).
271
‘‘[T]he public ha[s] come to rely on the trademark primarily as representing a
satisfactory level of product quality emanating from a common, though anonymous,
source.” 1 GILSON LALONDE ET AL., supra note 112, § 1.03[3][a] (citing Frank Schechter,
The Rational Basis for Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813, 816–19 (1927)).
Nothing in the IACA or in its definition of Indianness is capable of curbing variance
among the quality levels of Indian-made products. For a discussion on changing the
quality of one’s product after one has established a trademark, see id.
272
It is ironic that one of the reasons Indians pushed for trademark-like protection of
Indianness was because Indian-made goods—often handmade, or traditionally made—
were of better quality than the mass-produced fakes producers fabricated overseas using
lower-quality materials and inferior means of production, since the “solution” of relying
on a producer’s political affiliation guarantees neither that Indian producers will make
high-quality goods, nor that non-affiliated artisans will produce wares of lesser quality
than those Indians make. In fact, leading authorities unsurprisingly estimate that “the
quality of the fakes is getting ‘better’—that is, more authentic-looking and thus harder to
detect. Hapiuk, supra note 7, at 1043 (citing John Shiffman, $1 Billion Industry Reeling
as Faux Crafts Flood Market, USA TODAY, Apr. 8, 1998, at A2).
273
See discussion supra Part II.C.
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Furthermore, as a practical matter, the group of artisans the
IACA authorizes to label their goods “Indian” is too varied to
accurately designate a source of origin from such a mark. Not all
Indians live, work or originate from the same location.274 Not all
Indians have experienced similar historical events or treatment at
the hands of the government.275 Nor are “Indian” artisans
incorporated or affiliated in some way that would make Indianness
a useful designation of origin. Even if “origin” in this context
were to mean cultural, racial, ethnic or religious origin, ‘‘origin’’
in § 43(a) of the Lanham Act refers to geographic origin and origin
of production or manufacture, and not authorship of a creative
work.276 For the foregoing reasons, courts should not consider
non-enrolled individuals who declare themselves and their goods
“Indian” to be making false statements of fact about a product for
the purposes of § 43(a).
b) The Strict Liability Requirement
Even if § 43(a) of the Lanham Act appropriately governs one’s
status as an enrolled Indian under the Act, the IACA should allow
Indian Gap Indians—who use the word “Indian” in its descriptive
rather than legal sense—to employ the term. Even if one reads
most of the restrictions on advertisements under § 43(a) into the
IACA, one should not include the current strict liability standard at
work under regular § 43(a) violations.
Under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, a defendant need not have
had any intent to make a false or misleading representation, or
evidence an intent to deceive consumers.277 This policy is a
conscious deviation from the 1920 Trademark Act, from which §
43(a) of the Lanham Act derives.278 Section 3 of the 1920 Act
requires that sellers must make any false designation “willfully and
274

See Hapiuk, supra note 7, at 1063 (“Demographic changes . . . are altering the
relationship that many Indians have with Indian tribes.).
275
See id. 1059 (noting that the federal government has created some tribes where none
existed before, while on other occasions it has divided single tribes into multiple bands,
and even terminated altogether).
276
1 GILSON LALONDE ET AL., supra note 112, § 1.03[3][b].
277
See Andrews, supra note 266, at 114.
278
Gary S. Marx, Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act: A Statutory Cause of Action for
False Advertising, 40 WASH & LEE L. REV. 383, 391 (1983).
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with an intent to deceive.”279 This change in the Lanham Act—
which Congress created in 1946—evinces Congress’ desire to
bring a broader class of misrepresentative commercial actions—
beyond the willful attempts of one seller to pass off her goods as
those of another seller—under the ambit of statutory trademark
protection.280 Since even unintentional misrepresentations are
violations of § 43(a), damages allowable under the provision are
limited to civil remedies, and not punitive damages.281
The IACA is itself silent on the issue of intent.282 Because
courts construe § 305e of the IACA as parallel and analogous to
the Lanham Act, however, they impose strict liability for each
“commercial transaction involving a ‘false suggestion’ that
merchandise was manufactured by Indians,”283 and do not inquire
into the intent of the defendant in cases brought under the IACA.284
Nonetheless, there is evidence in the construction of the statute that
an intent element should be a necessary precondition of liability
under the IACA.
First, in contrast to the exclusively civil remedies available
under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, the IACA contains criminal
provisions.285 The IACA further provides that courts may hold
violators liable for treble damages, or up to $1,000 per day for the
duration of the infraction, whichever is greater.286 Courts may also
award punitive damages. In other areas of American law, the
government typically enacts strict liability statutes in limited
circumstances only—when there is an unreasonable risk of
harm287—that are not present in the field of the Indian goods trade.

279

Id.
Andrews, supra note 266, at 103.
281
Id. at 100–01 n.12.
282
See 18 U.S.C. § 1159(a) (2000); 25 U.S.C. § 305e(a) (2000). See also Native Am.
Arts, Inc. v. Vill. Originals, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 876, 881 (N.D. Ill. 1998).
283
Id. at 881–82 (N.D. Ill.1998). See also Native Am. Arts, v. Earthdweller, Ltd., No.
01 C 2370, 2002 WL 1173513, at *5 (N.D. Ill. May 29, 2002) (“The IACA imposes strict
liability for each IACA violation, regardless of [the defendant’s] intent.”).
284
See, e.g., Native Am. Arts, 2002 WL 1173513.
285
See 18 U.S.C. § 1159(b) (2000)
286
25 U.S.C. § 305e(a)–(b) (2000).
287
Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Strict Liability in Action: The Truncated Learned Hand
Formula, 52 LA. L. REV. 323, 325 (1991).
280
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Second—also in contrast to § 43(a)’s enhanced scope of
liability, which broadens the ambit of the statute beyond actions in
which sellers attempt to pass off their products as someone
else’s—Congress enacted the IACA precisely to combat the
problem of non-Indians passing their products off as “Indian.”288
This suggests that Congress aimed for the IACA to punish
fraudulent conduct, not simply eradicate all forms of consumer
confusion. It is thus unnecessary and overly restrictive for the
IACA to utilize a similar strict liability measure of intent.
C. It’s Just Too Personal: Why Lawmakers Should be Sensitive to
Issues of Identity
From a policy standpoint, perhaps the most important reason
why § 43(a) is ill-suited to combat the problem of fake Indian
crafts is because the form of “false designation of origin . . . or any
false description or representation” used “in connection with”289
the sale of Indian goods—like the IACA itself—has more than
economic implications. The ability to label one’s goods “Indianmade” is not just a statement about the goods, but also about the
producer. While the text of § 43(a) is not definitive on the
question of whether false representations must pertain to a quality
of the goods—versus a quality of the maker, such as Indianness—
no § 43(a) case currently appears to exist in which the ethnicity of
the maker of a good is the relevant legal inquiry. Section 43(a)
cases focus on factual matters relating to qualities of the goods
themselves—whether about ingredients used in making a particular
product,290 the geographic region of a product’s manufacture,291 or

288

See Native Am. Arts, v. Earth Dweller, No. 01-C-2370, 2001 WL 910394, at *4
(N.D. Ill. Aug. 8, 2001) (“Non-Indian makers of such goods must not ‘pass off’ their
products as ones made by Indians, Indian tribes or Indian arts and crafts organizations
when they are not” (citing Ho-Chunk Nation v. J.C. Penney, No. 98 C 3924, 1999 WL
1068700 at *4 (N.D Ill. Nov. 17, 1999))). See also Barker, supra note 62, at 46–47 (“It’s
all a matter of dollars and cents; that is why these impostors want to call themselves
Indian. But our motives are pure. We are only interested in the good of Indian culture.”).
289
15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1125 (West 2006).
290
See generally Pizza Hut v. Papa John’s Int’l, 227 F.3d 489, 495–98 (5th Cir. 2000).
291
See generally Cmty. of Roquefort v. William Faehndrich, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 291, 294
(S.D.N.Y. 1961) (“[A]nyone who makes sheep’s milk blue-mold cheese in the
Community of Roquefort can call it ‘Roquefort.’ In the second place, anyone can make
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otherwise whether a product is what it claims to be.292 In such
cases, no likelihood exists for hurt feelings. No personal attacks
on individual identity are conceivable. If a court finds that a
producer violated § 43(a) because his cheese is not, as labeled,
made in France, or because his pizza dough is not made with
filtered water, the producer has a choice of whether to stop labeling
his products as such, or instead alter his business practices to
reflect his representations and make them true. Artisans whom the
IACA does not classify as Indians and who cannot seek tribal
enrollment, however, have no similar recourse. They cannot,
through making new products, or using different methods of
production, achieve the arbitrarily determined quality of Indianness
as required under the IACA. When Indianness becomes a
commodity for sale in and of itself, sellers cease to exclusively sell
goods and begin to sell themselves. The result is a unique form of
objectification and sale of the Indian—mostly by white
consumers—that smacks of hypocrisy when the government touts
the IACA as a law bent on increasing Indian sovereignty and social
amelioration.
The mere fact that Congress did not design the IACA primarily
as a cultural heritage law293 does not mean that lawmakers should
settle for a law that fails to account for what is a cultural heritage
problem: individuals’ inability to call themselves what they believe
they are. When it comes to “economic” regulations that effectively
tell American citizens which parts of their cultural identities—
especially the immutable parts—they can identify with, courts and
legislatures should be especially sensitive to the possibility of
cultural harm that could result.294 In the case of the IACA, the
sheep’s milk blue-mold cheese and can market it under any name he sees fit except that if
it is not made in the Community of Roquefort he may not call it ‘Roquefort Cheese.’”).
292
See generally Coca-Cola Co. v. Tropicana Prods., Inc., 690 F. 2d 312 (2d Cir. 1982)
(“The [orange juice] ad makes an explicit representation that Premium Pack is produced
by squeezing oranges and pouring the freshly-squeezed juice directly into the carton.
This is not a true representation of how the product is prepared.”).
293
See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 106-452, at 1 (2000), reprinted in 2000 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2123,
2123.
294
See SHEFFIELD, supra note 21, at 6–7 (“[A]ny law, statutory or otherwise, that
defines an ethnic group will have social implications beyond the narrow focus of the law,
at least in the United States. Federal Indian law . . . is assumed to have an even greater
potential for social Impact. Indian law calls out for anthropological treatment—not
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marginalization of a significant portion of Indian Gap artisans
easily outweighs any benefits that may arise from decreasing
consumer confusion. If the IACA cannot eradicate consumer
confusion without marginalizing and offending huge numbers of
potential contributors to the Indian art community, Congress
should be willing to consider that perhaps no law at all is better
than a bad one.
V. IN NEED OF A SOLUTION
A. Aligning Consumer and Indian Interest: A Game of
Redefinition
The first hurdle in implementing any effective solution lies in
ensuring that given assumptions are consistent with the realities of
the operating forum, and that one adequately accounts for such
assumptions. If Congress is to enact a solution that helps to
preclude misguided consumers from purchasing fake Indian goods,
consumers must be both aware of the IACA’s existence and
genuinely confused about the origins of the goods they purchase.295
Assuming consumers are in fact confused, the government
must next determine which goods it will deem real and which it
will consider counterfeit, as well as which consumers need this
form of statutory protection. Under the IACA, “non-authentic”
and “Indian” are mutually exclusive terms: artisans who are
politically Indian produce authentic products, while non-politically
Indian artisans cannot.296 As demonstrated above, this model is
flawed. Similarly, if consumers are aware of the disparity between
because it deals with American Indians, but because it exists solely to maintain and
enhance (and sometimes destroy) their social and political existence as peoples separate
from the dominant society of the United States.”).
295
In the fashion industry, consumers intentionally purchase knock-off jewelry,
handbags, and clothing every day because such ersatz goods are less expensive than their
genuine counterparts. See generally Amendolara, supra note 2. Is it not thus
unreasonable to question the extent to which consumer confusion actually plays a role in
the number of counterfeit items sold? Since consumers intentionally purchase counterfeit
goods regardless of the labels such goods bear, a statute like the IACA likely has no
effect on consumer purchasing patterns.
296
See 18 U.S.C. § 1159(a) (2000); 25 U.S.C. § 305e(a) (2000).
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their notions of “Indianness/authenticity” and the IACA’s notions
of “Indianness/authenticity,” they may begin to disregard such
labels all together—if they do not do so already—thereby
rendering the Act meaningless. Since the current system of tribal
enrollment fails to adequately comport with consumer notions of
the groups capable of making “authentic” Indian goods, and
therefore risks consumer disregard of the entire statutory scheme,
the current labeling regime must change.
1. Redefining Indianness
One solution would be for Congress to modify the IACA’s
definition of Indian while allowing the Act to function the way it
does now, thereby permitting the newly defined “Indians” to label
their goods as “Indian-made.”
Since the IACA does not bar manufacturers from producing
“look-a-like” goods, but rather merely regulates how sellers label
and market such wares, the Act places a great deal of faith in the
ability of consumers to choose the “correct” good.297 This model
implicitly hopes that market forces rather than legal means will be
effective in driving counterfeit Indian goods from the marketplace.
If the Act relies on consumers’ purchasing patterns to drive sellers
of fake goods from the market, the Act’s definition of what is
“real” and what is not must comport with consumer desires, or else
a model based on consumer choice is bound to prove ineffectual.
While such a solution sounds ideal in theory, the logistics of
such a system would prove as problematic as the current system of
delineation. These logistical difficulties are most evident if one
divides the current artisan population and their goods as sellers and
presently market them into a matrix involving quadrants as
follows: (1) enrolled authentic—the party traditionally aggrieved
by knockoffs; (2) enrolled and inauthentic—artists such as the
297

Leaving the extinction of fake Indian goods in the hands of consumers begs a
normative question as well as a practical one: is consumer awareness of and desire for
goods which are “Indian” and “authentic” even something to be encouraged? Or does it
simply promote fetishism and quaint notions of traditionalism that are better off
eradicated? In an age that seeks ever-increasing racial and ethnic equality and tolerance,
one could argue that encouraging such a stagnant view of Indian culture is detrimental to
this goal.
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Navajo producers who make the inauthentic kachina dolls; (3) nonenrolled and authentic—representing the Indian Gap; and (4) nonenrolled and inauthentic—artisans who either have no cognizable
basis for calling themselves Indian and/or are not misrepresenting
their goods as Indian-made.298 The current IACA allows only
Indians in quadrants one and two to label their products as “Indianmade” and bars artisans in quadrants three and four from making
use of such labels.299 At its crux, the aim of drawing a new Indian
line would be to reclassify Indian Gap Indians300 alongside the
Indians the IACA currently protects, thereby merely adding
quadrant three to quadrants one and two.301 Such a redefinition,
however, fails to account for the fraudulent practices of the artisans
in quadrant two. Consequently, some marketing practices would
likely continue to confuse consumers, and some Indian traditions
would still risk misrepresentation without recourse. An ideal law
would protect the artisans in quadrants one and three while
excluding those in quadrants two and four.302 Such a change
would eliminate the under/over-inclusiveness problem that plagues
the current IACA and other laws that use a political yardstick to
measure Indianness.

298

(1) Enrolled Authentic
(3) Non-Enrolled Authentic

(2) Enrolled Inauthentic
(4) Non-Enrolled Inauthentic

299

Shaded areas represent categories of people covered under the current IACA
categorization of “Indian.”
(1) Enrolled Authentic
(2) Enrolled Inauthentic
(3) Non-Enrolled Authentic
(4) Non-Enrolled Inauthentic
300

See discussion supra Part I.B.
Shaded areas represent categories of people covered under a hypothetical alteration
to the IACA’s current categorization of “Indian.”
(1) Enrolled Authentic
(2) Enrolled Inauthentic
(3) Non-Enrolled Authentic
(4) Non-Enrolled Inauthentic
301

302

Shaded areas represent the groups of people covered under an ideal formulation of
“Indian” for purposes of the IACA as the statute presently exists.
(1) Enrolled Authentic
(2) Enrolled Inauthentic
(3) Non-Enrolled Authentic
(4) Non-Enrolled Inauthentic
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However, absorbing Indian Gap Indians into the Indian
category is not an easy task. There is no objective way for one to
determine which individuals fall into the Indian Gap without
resorting to a method as arbitrary as the tribal enrollment
process303 because queries of whether an Indian fits within the Gap
fail to account for change over time and generations. Supporting
this contention, Gail Sheffield maintains that “[e]ven the most
cleverly drawn definition [of Indian status] will not conform
exactly to social reality in a world of fluid social and ethnic
boundaries.”304 One should thus greet any effort to redefine
Indianness with repugnance. From a societal stand point,
“hairsplitting between and among Indian people that is invited by
efforts to legislate Indianness is both divisive and
counterproductive.”305 Additionally, lawmakers should be wary of
redefining Indianness in any way that would infringe on the
sovereignty of individual Native American tribes to determine who
their members are.306
2. Redefining Authenticity
A second, and perhaps better solution, is for the government to
implement a new regime that focuses on the nature of the work
created and hence, the product’s independent “authenticity,”
regardless of the artist’s political affiliation. A false advertising
statute based on the relationship between an artist and his work,
rather than on an artist’s political demarcation could entirely avoid
inconsistencies regarding an individual’s relationship to a tribe or a
tribe’s relationship to the U.S. Government, either of which may
not recognize the artisan as an “Indian.” Furthermore, such a
system does not risk encroaching upon tribal autonomy.

303

SHEFFIELD, supra note 21, at 4.
Id. at 4.
305
Id. at 28.
306
Every federally-recognized Indian tribe possesses a basic power as sovereign entity
to determine the makeup of its own membership. The Supreme Court recognized this
power in 1897. See Roff v. Burney, 168 U.S. 218, 222 (1897). Stripping Indian tribes of
such an elemental right would contradict the overriding policy of self-determination and
increased tribal government that has been a hallmark of Indian policy since 1965. See
SHEFFIELD, supra note 21, at 45.
304
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Congress could avert the problems associated with determining
which individuals qualify as “Indian” while still proscribing the
sale of fake goods to unknowing consumers by changing the
inquiry of the IACA from a question of whether consumers would
incorrectly believe a product’s maker is an enrolled Indian, to one
of whether the consumer would incorrectly believe the product is
authentic to its maker either culturally, spiritually, traditionally, or
by some other measure. Under such a conception, wares artisans
make with inauthentic materials—as is the case in many instances
of intertribal misappropriation, against which the current Act fails
to protect—and goods manufacturers mass produce in overseas
factories could not bear “Indian-made” labels. Such a revised
scheme, however, would not preclude an artisan from labeling his
products as “Indian-made” simply because he failed to qualify for
tribal enrollment. When the government’s belief in an artist’s
Indianness and the artist’s belief in his own Indianness conflict, the
latter, rather than the former, will likely satisfy consumers’ hunger
for authenticity. Thus, tribal status should be irrelevant, so long as
the artist crafting the goods believes his self-identification as an
Indian imbues his wares with meaning stemming from his
Indianness.
While this system is not perfect, the policies of heightened
ownership of one’s identity and increased creativity and invention
this reformulation furthers are not small, easily-discarded
considerations. Any modification of the current system must in
some way focus on the goods rather than on the ethnicity of their
makers, so as to depersonalize the inquiry—if any—that relates to
whatever quality “Indianness” correlates to in both consumers’ and
Indians’ minds.
A solution that refocuses the “Indian” question away from
tribal recognition may not be completely out of line with the goals
of the IACA, because Indian Gap Indians may comprise part of the
group of Indians Congress intended the Act to help in the first
place. From its genesis in 1935, the goal of the Act was to help
Indian communities, and even in 1935 enrolled Indians did not
constitute the entirety of such communities.
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3. Requiring Intent to Deceive
A third solution would be for Congress to alter the way
authorities enforce the IACA by premising accountability under
the statute on intent rather than strict liability. Congress could
fulfill this aim by implementing a requirement wherein a plaintiff
who sues under the IACA must demonstrate that a seller acted with
the intent to “falsely suggest” mislabeled goods were Indian-made
in order to prevail under the statute. Such a solution would be
relatively easy to enforce, would not require altering the definition
of Indian or authenticity, and would be in keeping with the
legislative intent of the Act.307 Such a policy would, furthermore,
protect innocent artisans who in no way mean to “falsely suggest”
their goods are Indian-made against careless purchasers. Such an
enforcement mechanism would encourage informed and careful
shopping, benefiting the consumers most likely to care about
artisans and the craftsmanship of their goods. Elimination of the
strict liability element would distinguish an IACA cause of action
from regular false advertising or truth-in-advertising laws, to
which Indian and non-Indian goods alike remain subject.
B. Additional Efforts
Artisans themselves are also employing less legalistic
alternatives to help curb the proliferation of counterfeit goods
sales. Certification programs, for instance, such as the Indian Arts
and Crafts Association’s logo effort308 and the Made in Alaska309
program—of which artisans are making increasing use—help to
heighten consumer awareness of the existence of fakes and
encourage consumers to be vigilant when making purchases. Such
initiatives educate consumers about the prevalence of Indian fakes
in particular and the negative repercussions of such goods. As
consumers become increasingly aware of such programs, they may
change their purchasing patterns, bolstering sales of “real” Indian
goods—however the government defines them—and decreasing
307

See supra Part IV.B.1.b.
See The Indian Arts & Crafts Association, About Us, http://www.iaca.com/?page
=about (last visited Oct. 23, 2006).
309
Alaska Division of Community Advocacy, Made in Alaska Program,
http://www.dced.state.ak.us/dca/mia/home.htm (last visited Oct 23, 2006).
308
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instances of consumer confusion, thereby fulfilling the aims of the
IACA.
VI. CONCLUSION
The controversy surrounding which individuals may refer to
themselves as Indians under the Indian Arts and Crafts Act is just
one example of the problems that can occur when race and the law
mix. Marlon B. Ross, a writer and scholar on the subject of race
and identity politics, aptly notes that as a historical view of racism
in America demonstrates:
Race marks categories that determine who is legally
allowed and culturally endowed to hold certain kinds of
property. . . . [I]t is also a category that marks the bonds
and bounds of property itself; that is, who gets included and
excluded from the right to determine the value of
intellectual properties of others.310
Ross illustrates this point by quoting Albion W. Tourgée, lead
counsel for Plessy in Plessy v. Ferguson,311 the 1896 case that
challenged “separate but equal” treatment of African Americans:
Six-sevenths of the population is white.
Nineteentwentieths of the property of the country is owned by white
people. . . . Under these conditions, is it possible to
conclude that the reputation of being white is not property?
Indeed, is it not the most valuable sort of property, being
the master-key that unlocks the golden door of
opportunity?312
Brownell agrees, definitively stating that “[a]s long as race is
the basis of the government’s definition of Indian, self
determination will not be.”313 In the context of Indian arts, then,
310

Marlon B. Ross, The New Negro Displayed: Self-Ownership, Proprietary
Sites/Sights, and the Bonds/Bounds of Race, in CLAIMING THE STONES, NAMING THE
BONES: CULTURAL PROPERTY AND NEGOTIATION OF NATIONAL AND ETHNIC IDENTITY 259
(Elazar Barkan ed., 2002).
311
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
312
Id.
313
Brownell, supra note 57, at 317.
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the problem with any governmental definition of Indian status lies
not so much in the substantive definition of Indianness the
government employs, but rather in who creates such a definition
and from where it originates. If Congress implements a new
enforcement system for properly identifying authenticity that does
not hinge on any definition of Indianness, it could well avoid
difficult issues of sovereignty, government intrusion, and
individual identity.

